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ALL COPYING IS NOT CREATED EQUAL: BORROWED 
LANGUAGE IN SUPREME COURT OPINIONS  
Adam Feldman* 
A. INTRODUCTION
Imitation may be the most sincere form of flattery,1 but in 
the language of the law, the demarcation between imitation and 
wholesale borrowing remains opaque. This is especially true in 
the Supreme Court’s opinion-construction process. This article 
examines the implications of the Court’s use of substantive 
language directly from merits briefs. To do this, the article 
critically analyzes the relationship between merits briefs and 
opinions, focusing on instances in which there is strong evidence 
that briefs played a substantial role in the Court’s choice of 
majority-opinion language. The analysis compares phrasing 
from briefs and opinions and locates a case type in which briefs 
have played an especially influential role. 
*Postdoctoral Fellow in the Empirical Study of Public Law, Columbia Law School; Ph.D. 
candidate, University of Southern California; J.D., Boalt Hall, University of California, 
Berkeley; B.A., University of California, Los Angeles. 
 1. See, e.g., CHARLES CALEB COLTON, LACON: OR, MANY THINGS IN FEW WORDS;
ADDRESSED TO THOSE WHO THINK § CCXVII, 114 (1824) (asserting that “[i]mitation is 
the sincerest of flattery”). The sentiment has been expressed elsewhere, of course, but 
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While there is an expectation among those experienced in 
Supreme Court practice that language from briefs will seep into 
the Court’s opinions,2 there is considerable variation in the 
extent and types of overlapping language. Maybe due to this 
expectation, there is minimal scholarship dedicated to examining 
instances of high levels of language sharing between Supreme 
Court opinions and the sources of opinion language such as 
merits briefs, as well the normative consequences of this 
language-sharing practice.3 To help explain the variation in 
shared language from case to case, this article contains a 
typology of relationships between briefs and opinions and 
presents examples of the different types before focusing on the 
brief-opinion relationship in which briefs play the greatest role: 
what I characterize as cases having “Lifted” opinions. 
The manner in which Justices and their clerks utilize 
language from merits briefs in Supreme Court opinions shows 
distinct practices across Justices’ chambers and across time. By 
inquiring into the inputs for the information and wording in 
Supreme Court opinions, we may begin to better understand the 
opinion-construction process in a fashion that interviews with 
clerks and Justices alone cannot convey.4
Recent evidence shows that from 1946 through 2013, 
Supreme Court opinions shared 9.55 percent of their language, 
on average, with individual merits briefs.5 That analysis of 
2. See, e.g., TODD C. PEPPERS & ARTEMUS WARD, IN CHAMBERS: STORIES OF 
SUPREME COURT LAW CLERKS AND THEIR JUSTICES (2012); DAVID L. WEIDEN &
ARTEMUS WARD, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 206 (2006) (indicating that Justice Stewart might ask a 
clerk to “‘[w]rite an opinion along the lines of the United States brief’ or ‘the petitioner’s 
brief’”); Karl N. Llewellyn, A Lecture on Appellate Advocacy, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 627, 638 
(1962) (declaring that “your brief ought to . . .  offer the court something that it can lift, 
verbatim, into the opinion taking care of all prior authority, phrasing the whole 
satisfactorily, and applying it to the case in hand”). 
3. See e.g. Adam Liptak, Clarence Thomas, A Supreme Court Justice of Few Words, 
Some of Them Others’, N.Y. TIMES, August 28, 2015, at A11 (questioning whether 
language overlap between merits briefs and Justice Thomas’s opinions rises to a level of 
“cribbing”).
4. See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE 
SUPREME COURT 34–35 (1979) (discussing the secrecy involved in the interactions 
between Supreme Court Justices and clerks in the decisionmaking process). 
 5. Adam Feldman, A Brief Assessment of Supreme Court Opinion Language, 86 MISS.
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BORROWED LANGUAGE IN SUPREME COURT OPINIONS 23
almost 10,000 briefs elucidates several patterns in the ways that 
merits-brief language makes its way into Supreme Court 
opinions. The main foci of this article are cases in which the 
briefs have the greatest impact on the Court’s opinions or, put 
another way, cases in which the language from a merits brief is 
most fundamental to the language of the opinion.6
In many of these instances, the Court uses language from 
the briefs as its own without attribution. With these examples, 
this article confronts the normative question about when the 
Court should note that the opinion language does not originate 
with the Justices and their clerks.7
In addition to examining specific brief-opinion 
relationships, this article also looks at the factors that tie the set 
of cases together. In this sample of cases there are common 
threads in terms of the attributes of the cases, Justices, and 
litigants. These shared features show that cases with high levels 
of language overlap are not entirely random. 
The underlying premise of this article is that the language 
in Supreme Court opinions matters. The article begins by 
looking at why opinion language matters and by developing a 
hypothesis for why we might expect the language in briefs to 
filter into Supreme Court opinions, sometimes in especially high 
doses. After this introduction and a short discussion of how the 
article tracks the linguistic similarities between briefs and 
opinions, the article compares the cases of interest with their 
respective briefs. To conclude, this article examines the 
normative implications of this language-sharing practice by 
focusing on the ways in which bringing it to light may affect the 
perception of the way the Court conducts its business. 
 6. Surprisingly, even these opinions including large sections of uncited language that 
overlaps with the merits briefs are not wholly devoid of citations to the briefs, which I 
elaborate on in the conclusion. 
 7. For instance, some might view overlapping language in the Court’s statements of 
facts as inconsequential, but view overlapping language in the Court’s assessment of the 
law as more worthy of attribution if unoriginal. Even with cited source material, there is 
often strong evidence of the impact of briefs on opinions through the sharing of citations to 
less-common references such as treatises and law reviews, as well as sharing of multiple 
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II. WHY FOCUS ON LANGUAGE
The strength of the Supreme Court’s precedents is only as 
iron-clad as opinion language permits. Time and again, issues 
left unsettled by the Supreme Court lead to new test cases that 
percolate back up to the Supreme Court. This can be illustrated 
by the Court’s sinuous precedent in Fourth Amendment cases 
that define the exclusionary rule.8 As language from past cases 
is repeated in subsequent cases, the specific wording of the 
opinions affects future decisions of the Supreme Court and 
lower courts. Indeed, when interviewed on the subject of 
Supreme Court opinions, Justice Scalia underscored the 
importance of opinion language: 
[T]he only important part about an appellate case is not 
who wins or loses; it’s not . . . affirmed or reversed. The 
important part is the opinion. And if you affirm or reverse 
for the wrong reason, you’ve done everything wrong. . . . 
[I]f you haven’t made clear what your holding is, instead of 
reducing litigation, instead of making life simpler for courts 
and lawyers below you, you’ve complicated it.9
 8. Although in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court broadly held that 
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment should be excluded from 
evidence at trial, subsequent cases either chipped away at this holding or added teeth to it. 
See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (creating a “good faith” exception to 
the exclusionary rule); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (holding that 
subject’s identity and body are not suppressible evidence under the exclusionary rule); 
Camera v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (holding that housing inspectors need a warrant 
to enter and search an apartment building); Schmerber v. Cal., 384 U.S. 757 (1966) 
(allowing physical evidence derived from a blood sample taken without the subject’s 
consent into evidence at trial). The various trajectories of the exclusionary rule are the 
focus of much scholarly debate and analysis. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, The Expressive 
Fourth Amendment: Rethinking the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 76 
MISS. L.J. 483 (2006) (analyzing the lack of clarity surrounding the good-faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule); David A. Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, Among Other 
Things: The Roberts Court Takes on the Fourth Amendment, 2005 CATO S. CT. REV. 283 
(discussing the ways in which the Court’s 2005 Fourth Amendment cases chip away at the 
exclusionary rule); Stephen E. Hessler, Note, Establishing Inevitability Without Active 
Pursuit: Defining the Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Fourth Amendment 
Exclusionary Rule, 99 MICH. L. REV. 238 (2000) (examining the lack of clarity 
surrounding the reach of the exclusionary rule); James L. Kainen, The Impeachment 
Exception to the Exclusionary Rules: Policies, Principles, and Politics, 44 STANFORD L.
REV. 1301 (1992) (looking at use of illegally obtained evidence to impeach a witness at 
trial). 
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Similarly, Justice Kennedy noted that “the law lives through 
language and we must be very careful about the language that 
we use.”10 With this understanding, many scholars take seriously 
the downstream effects of the Court’s opinion language in 
guiding and constraining future decisions in the Supreme Court 
and other courts.11
The source of Supreme Court opinion language is relevant 
to its institutional standing.12 There is an expectation for the 
Court to use language that comes from the machinations of the 
Justices based on their understandings of the Constitution as 
well as from citations to existing law and secondary sources.13
One of the main sources that provides potential language for 
Supreme Court opinions is parties’ merits briefs.14
 10. Bryan A. Garner, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, 13 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 79, 
97 (2010). 
11. See, e.g., Howard Gillman, The Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): 
Interpretative Institutionalism and the Analysis of Supreme Court Decision-Making, in
SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 65, 80 
(Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds. 1999) (“There is evidence that most justices 
act in accordance with the Court’s formal responsibility to decide actual legal disputes 
based on their best understanding of the law.”); GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE:
HOW LAW SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND KILLS POLITICS (2009) (noting that the way 
in which judges reason through their decisions in prior cases constrains judges’ later 
decisions); Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme 
Court Decision Making, 96 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 305 (2002) (looking at law’s 
influence—in contrast to personal political ideologies’ influence—on Supreme Court 
Justices because it operates as a means of establishing specific case factors as relevant or 
setting levels of scrutiny); Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course 
and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001) 
(articulating a theory of the historic course of decisions as a shaper of subsequent 
outcomes).
12. See LIEF H. CARTER & THOMAS FREDERICK BURKE, REASON IN LAW (2005)
(utilizing “logic of the triad” framing to explain judicial legitimacy). For background on 
the framework of the “logic of the triad” and its application to legal institutions see 
generally Martin M. Shapiro, COURTS, A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS
(1981), and Alec Stone Sweet, Judicialization and the Construction of Governance, 32 
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES 147 (1999). 
13. See Hathaway, supra note 11.
 14. Of course, the Court uses lower court opinions, amicus curiae briefs, and original 
research in the preparation of its opinions as well. See, e.g., Paul M. Collins, Jr., Pamela C. 
Corley & Jesse Hamner, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on U.S. Supreme Court 
Opinion Content, 49 L. & SOC’Y REV. 917 (2015); Pamela C. Corley, Paul M. Collins & 
Bryan Calvin, Lower Court Influence on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Content, 73 J.
POLITICS 31 (2011); Todd C. Peppers & Christopher Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on 
Supreme Court Decision Making: An Empirical Assessment, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 51 
(2008). While I do not exclude the possibility that the merits brief and the opinion both 
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Briefs organize and synthesize cases for the Justices and 
clerks, minimizing their need to turn to other sources.15 They 
also distill the information so the Justices and clerks can focus 
on other case attributes.16 Chief Justice Rehnquist underscored 
this point when he wrote, “The brief writer must . . . bring order 
to [the case materials] by organizing—and I cannot stress that 
term enough—by organizing, organizing, and organizing, so that 
the brief is a coherent presentation of the arguments in favor of 
the writer’s client.”17
Given that the Justices’ own statements describe the brief’s 
importance in organizing all of the case material for their 
digestion, it may not be surprising that there is directly 
overlapping language in some cases between the opinion and a 
brief. The extent of this relationship, however, varies immensely 
and studies have up to this point been generally devoid of such 
analysis because qualitative assessments—like the one that I 
discuss here—of the language shared between Supreme Court 
briefs and opinions are sparse.18
between individual merits briefs and the Court’s opinions that will be shown below 
corroborates the direct influence of the briefs. 
 15. E. Barrett Prettyman, Some Observations Concerning Appellate Advocacy, 39 VA.
L. REV. 285, 290–91 (1953) (describing utility of briefs for judges). 
 16. Mark R. Kravitz, Written and Oral Persuasion in the United States Courts: A 
District Judge’s Perspective on their History, Function, and Future, 10 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 247, 261–62 (2009) (characterizing the brief as “a superior and more efficient 
method of conveying detailed information to a judge,” and noting that “it is always handy 
for the judge to have the written submission, and all of its points and authorities, at 
hand . . . because the judge need not expend great effort in capturing and storing an 
argument to memory,” which allows the judge to “expend more energy on understanding it 
and assessing its persuasiveness”). 
 17. William H. Rehnquist, From Webster to Word-Processing: The Ascendance of the 
Appellate Brief, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 4 (1999); see also Richard A. Posner, 
Convincing a Federal Court of Appeals, 25 LITIG. 3, 3 (1999) (explaining that an effective 
brief is self-contained, so that the judge does not need to consult other sources in order to 
understand what is at issue); Albert Tate, The Art of Brief Writing: What a Judge Wants to 
Read, 4 LITIG. 11, 13 (1978) (discussing the brief as an organization tool or “judge’s 
companion” useful “from before the oral argument until the rehearing is denied”). 
18. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 111 (1990) 
(explaining that “[j]udges’ opinions do not acknowledge the borrowing of ideas, even 
language, from the parties’ briefs, so the evaluation of a judge’s creativity requires 
comparison between the opinion and the briefs in each case”); see also LEE EPSTEIN &
JOSEPH FISKE KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE: ABORTION AND 
THE DEATH PENALTY 113 (1992) (stating that in the opinion for Gregg v. Ga., 428 U.S. 
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This article relies on mixed methods, cutting between 
quantitative and qualitative ends of the spectrum. As I explain in 
the following section, I use quantitative methods to locate the 
specific cases and briefs of interest. I then analyze the content of 
the shared language to generate inferences surrounding these 
relationships in cases with the greatest percentage of shared 
language.19
III. MEASURING LANGUAGE OVERLAP
Text-analysis software allows for precise measurements of 
shared language. A drawback, however, is that the language 
from the two sources must be a near match, and as a 
consequence, the software does not pick up on shared meaning 
when the words differ.20 I use WCopyfind software for the 
analyses on which this article is based.21 This program compares 
two documents and reports the similarities in their words, both 
in terms of percentage of overlapping language and number of 
shared words. The user chooses and inputs certain settings to 
calibrate the requirements of language similarity necessary for 
the program to note an instance of overlap. 
A. Program Settings and Examples 
Understanding the WCopyfind settings is essential to 
contextualizing what a high percentage of overlap in a Supreme 
Court case means. I use the default settings as others have done 
in studies looking at similar relationships of language in legal 
 19. The percentage is based on the amount of shared language relative to the total 
opinion, not to the total brief. 
 20. For example, it would not pick up on the instances in which Justice Cardozo used 
briefs’ language as a starting point, but changed the actual words for his opinions. POSNER
supra note 18, at 111–12 (comparing Justice Cardozo’s graceful language in one opinion 
with the stilted language in an amicus brief that appears to have been its inspiration, but 
noting that Cardozo opinions actually “owe little even those briefs that are excellent”). In 
this sense software that measures language similarity is generally under-inclusive of the 
actual relationship between the language in briefs and opinions. The software I use—
WCopyfind, see infra note 21 and accompanying text—has a parameter setting for the 
percentage of phrases that must match, however, allowing for some flexibility in locating 
overlapping language. 






      11/10/2016   09:41:10
38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 18 Side B      11/10/2016   09:41:10
FELDMANRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2016 12:38 PM
28 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
and political texts.22 The first setting deals with the number of 
words in a phrase that must be similar for the program to mark it 
as an instance of overlap. I set the minimum phrase length at six 
words. This means that phrases under five words will not be 
indicated, while phrases of six words or more will be processed. 
The second significant setting deals with the percent of language 
commonality that phrases must share for the program to 
recognize a phrase as relevant. I set this to eighty percent, which 
allows for slight differences between phrases in which the 
majority of the content is the same. Finally, the program is set to 
allow at most two imperfections in the shared language, so it 
will not pick up phrases that overlap at eighty percent or more if 
there are more than two differences between them. 
These settings may be easier to visualize through a 
straightforward example. In Lawson v. FMR,23 the program 
recorded this sentence in the opinion as overlapping with the 
petitioner’s brief: “[The Report concludes]: ‘Congress must 
reconsider the incentive system that has been set up that 
encourages accountants and lawyers who come across fraud in 
their work to remain silent.’” The bracketed words were not 
shared with the brief (the brief and the opinion referring to the 
same document using different phrasing for its title), but due to 
the more than eighty-percent similarity, the program marked the 
entire passage as overlapping, and highlighted the words that did 
not overlap. Lawson also contains this language: “[the 
provisions require] accountants and lawyers for public 
companies to investigate and report misconduct, or risk being 
banned from further practice before the SEC.”24 The 
respondent’s brief has similar—but not exactly the same—
wording: “[u]nder these provisions, a law firm or public 
22. See, e.g., Pamela C. Corley, The Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The 
Influence of Parties’ Briefs, 61 POLITICAL RESEARCH Q. 468 (2008); see also RYAN C.
BLACK & RYAN J. OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT (2012); Paul M. Collins, Jr., Pamela C. Corley & Jesse Hamner, Me Too? An 
Investigation of Repetition in U.S. Supreme Court Amicus Curiae Briefs, 97 JUDICATURE
228 (Mar./Apr. 2014); Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha, Presidential Influence of the News Media: 
The Case of the Press Conference, 30 POLITICAL COMM. 548 (2013); Justin Grimmer, A
Bayesian Hierarchical Topic Model for Political Texts: Measuring Expressed Agendas in 
Senate Press Releases, 18 POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1 (2010). 
 23. ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1170 (2014). 
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accounting firm that engages in retaliation against such 
whistleblowing can be banned from further practice before the 
SEC.”25 The program highlighted only “banned from further 
practice before the SEC.” From this result, it is apparent that the 
program misses some matches in meaning (in this instance 
references to the types of firms banned and the types of actions 
that warrant this ban) unless the wording is approximately 
identical. 
Another important setting is that WCopyfind ignores 
punctuation in matching, so that, for instance, the difference of a 
comma between phrases will not change the program’s results. 
In Lawson, for example, the phrase in the opinion citing the 
statutory language of “discriminate against an employee in the 
terms and conditions of employment because”26 comes up as an 
exact match with the same phrase in the petitioner’s brief, 
notwithstanding quotation marks around the phrase in the 
petitioner’s version and not in the opinion.27 WCopyfind also 
ignores letter case, so a phrase that is the same in both instances 
except for an upper-case letter in one would come up as a 
complete match. 
B. Types of Language Shared Generally 
WCopyfind does not discriminate between types of 
overlap, so the matches found in my analysis contain language 
that is likely meaningful in the brief-opinion relationship as well 
as language that is most likely in the brief and opinion either by 
pure chance or because of its importance to the case. As above, 
this process may be easier to visualize through a straightforward 
example. I use the opinion and the Solicitor General’s (SG’s) 
brief from FERC v. Mississippi28 to illustrate the spectrum of 
language overlap from presumably inconsequential to likely 
meaningful. 
 25. Brief for Respondent at 41, Lawson v. FMR, 2013 WL 5441390 (U.S. Sept. 30, 
2013) (No. 12-3). 
 26. Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1161. 
 27. See Brief for Petitioner at 8, Lawson v. FMR, 2013 WL 3972434 (U.S. July 31, 
2013) (No. 12-3). 
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I focus on two main facets in each phrase. First, whether 
the language is original or quoted, including whether the opinion 
cites to the brief or whether either cites to an extrinsic source. 
The second is the type of phrase, focusing on whether it is facts, 
argument, a citation from a statute or case, and so on. To 
describe the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, Justice 
Blackmun writes for the Court that it “was part of a package of 
legislation approved the same day, designed to combat the 
nationwide energy crisis at the time.”29 The SG’s brief contains 
this language: “The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 
1978 . . . was enacted by Congress as part of a package of 
legislation designed to combat the nationwide energy crisis.”30
Here, the shared language consists of “part of a package of 
legislation designed to combat the nationwide energy crisis.” 
This descriptive, factual language is not treated as a quotation in 
either place, and so it may be assumed as original in both the 
brief and opinion. The shared description makes it clear, 
however, that the Court agrees with the SG’s characterization of 
the legislation, but does not attribute it to the SG. 
FERC contains many instances in which the language is 
similar to that used in the SG’s brief, but the opinion does not 
mention the SG’s brief as a source. An example of a statement 
from the recitation of facts in the opinion that overlaps with the 
SG’s brief includes this shared phrasing:31
29. Id. at 745. 
 30. Brief for Appellants at 2, FERC v. Mississippi, 1981 WL 390123 (U.S. Aug. 27, 
1981) (No. 80-1749) [hereinafter FERC Brief]. 
 31. In this and all two-column comparisons in this article, the brief is on the left and the 
opinion is on the right. 
 32. FERC Brief, supra note 30, at 2–3. 
 33. FERC, 456 U.S. at 745–46. 
[E]lectric utilities were 
plagued with skyrocketing fuel 
costs and decreasing efficiency 
in the use of their generating 
capacity; both of these factors 
had an adverse effect on rates 
to consumers and on the 
economy. 32
[E]lectricity utilities were 
plagued with increasing costs 
and decreasing efficiency in 
the use of their generating 
capacities; each of these 
factors had an adverse effect 
on rates to consumers and on 
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Similar to the phrase previously mentioned, this portion of the 
opinion does not cite to the SG’s brief or to an extrinsic source, 
yet the language is an almost exact match. Importantly, in this 
example the different word choices do not change the meaning 
of the text. 
Another type of shared language occurs when the brief and 
the opinion share a citation. An example in FERC is “[the 
statutory section] directs FERC, in consultation with state 
regulatory authorities, to promulgate ‘such rules as it determines 
necessary to encourage cogeneration and small power 
production.’”34 In such instances the shared language provides 
evidence of a shared understanding of the importance of the 
statutory language. In isolation, one cannot infer that the brief 
writer’s choice of language led to the adoption of the same 
language in the opinion. Considered cumulatively with other 
instances of shared language, though, this overlap underscores 
the possibility of, at a minimum, coinciding views between the 
brief writer and the opinion writer. 
Opinions may also share language with the brief’s 
argument. This is perhaps the best evidence of the persuasive 
power of the brief, especially when the phrasing is not attributed 
to the brief’s author. An example of shared argument language 
from the opinion in FERC appears in this sentence: “It is 
sufficient that Congress was not irrational in concluding that 
limited federal regulation of retail sales of electricity and natural 
gas, and of relationships between cogenerators and electric 
utilities, was essential.”35 In the brief the word “sufficient” is 
replaced with “clear enough”36 which does little to alter the 
meaning of the phrase, providing the Court with some 
background for treating the “clear enough” evidence of 
Congressional intent as legally “sufficient.” The opinion uses 
this sentence to support its subsequent declaration that this “is 
enough to place the challenged portions of PURPA within 
 34. Id. at 751 (emphasis added to highlight language not shared between brief and 
opinion).
35. Id. at 758 (emphasis added to highlight language not shared between brief and 
opinion).
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Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.”37 While it does 
not provide conclusive evidence that the wording in the brief led 
to the phrasing in the opinion, this overlap, along with other 
phrases in the opinion that articulate viewpoints congruent with 
the SG’s position, lends support to the proposition that the 
Justices (or their clerks38) read and analyzed the brief and found 
it persuasive, and it potentially also indicates that they adopted 
the brief’s language for the opinion itself. 
C. Exploring the Cases 
Some shared features of the cases in this study, which 
covers the 1946 through 2013 Supreme Court Terms,39 are 
worthy of note. These similarities provide insight into the factors 
or mechanisms that play a role in extremely high levels of 
language overlap between opinions and merits briefs.40 Previous 
works show that the Court tends to share more or less language 
with briefs based on specific factors such as the presence of the 
SG as counsel of record.41
Along with the percentage of overlapping language for 
each case, I also aggregated the number of overlapping words in 
each brief-opinion pair. Upon analysis I found one subset of 
cases in which there is an especially high probability that merits 
briefs will strongly impact Supreme Court opinion content. 
Table 1 presents the typical impact of merits briefs on 
opinions, which depends on the combination of the percentage 
of the opinion that shares language with the brief and the 
number of words in the opinion that overlap with words from 
 37. FERC, 456 U.S. at 751. 
38. See generally David J. Garrow, The Lowest Form of Animal Life? 84 CORNELL L.
REV. 855 (1999) (reviewing books that look at clerks’ lead roles in drafting opinions). 
 39. I use Washington University’s well-known Supreme Court Database. Spaeth et. al., 
Supreme Court Database, WASH. UNIV. L. (2014), http://www.supremecourtdatabase.org. 
 40. This article does not delve into causal mechanisms. The factors linking cases 
merely show correlations that may help generate a deeper causal understanding of the role 
that briefs play in influencing opinion language. 
 41. For empirical results supporting this correlate, see Feldman, supra note 5. For 
empirical support of the SG’s success before the Supreme Court from multiple dimensions 
including shared language with the Court’s opinions, see generally Black and Owens, 
supra note 22, and see Corley, supra note 22, at 476 (showing that the Court shared more 
language with the Solicitor General’s briefs than with those of other experienced members 
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the brief. (Both calculations are from the same overlapping 
language.) The distinction between these subsets is based on an 
extensive qualitative analysis of the brief-opinion relationships 
in the dataset. In certain cases, as will become evident below, 
the relationship between brief and opinion will not neatly fit into 
the relationship type described in the typology. The typology is 
not meant to encompass every brief-opinion relationship, but 
rather to work as a heuristic to approximately group these 
linguistic relationships.42 The thresholds for overlapping words 
and percentages are guidelines that lead to a reasonable 
separation of groups, and most importantly, they separate out the 
highest-impact group: the Lifted relationship.43
Later in the article I present examples from all four types of 
relationships, but the Lifted group presents some of the strongest 
examples indicating that specific briefs made meaningful 
contributions to the language in the opinions and that the 
opinions used substantive language from the briefs. To bracket 
the cases, I set a threshold of thirty-three percent overlap 
between opinion and brief as the demarcation between high and 
low percentage overlap and 1,000 shared words as the 
demarcation between high and low word overlap. 
42. See e.g. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 99 n.9 (1974) (referring, in the course of 
creating a typology to estimate and explain the advantage of “repeat players” in litigation, 
to SG’s establishment of trusting relationship at Supreme Court). 
 43. I used a multi-methods approach to help locate these cases. See NICHOLAS WELLER 
& JEB BARNES, FINDING PATHWAYS: MIXED-METHOD RESEARCH FOR STUDYING 
CAUSAL MECHANISMS (2014). 
Table 1 






























Greatest impact throughout 
opinion; brief used as template; 
shared legal reasoning and 
salient language; brief clear 
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Shared Understanding 
Shared language generally 
interspersed throughout opinion; 
includes facts, law, secondary 
authority—often with significant 
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There are twenty-two Lifted opinions in the dataset. 
Although there are a few exceptions, most use language from 
merits briefs as templates for the wording in the opinions. This 
often includes the Court’s adopting the argument from the brief. 
In Lifted opinions in particular the percentage overlap and 
overlapping word metrics do not provide the entire picture. As 
the examples below show, instances of language overlap in these 
cases also point to sections in the opinion that almost assuredly 
derive from language in the brief, but due to the software’s 
capabilities and limitations, do not come up as overlapping 
matches. 
The last case that fits the Lifted criteria is from 1993. This 
implies that the relationship between specific merits briefs and 
the Court’s opinions has evolved away from Lifted opinions in 
the last several decades.44 That last Lifted opinion—from 
1993—was, like the majority of Lifted opinions, authored by 
Justice Blackmun. As I show below, Justice Blackmun was the 
majority opinion writer for twelve of the twenty-two Lifted 
opinions, and each of these Blackmun opinions shares a 
substantial amount of language with a brief from the SG. 
Finally, there is a strong distinction in the cases between 
the amount of language each Lifted opinion shares with the non-
highly similar merits brief and the amount each shares with the 
highly similar merits brief. This is evident from the fact that no 
Lifted opinion shares the threshold number of words and 
percentage overlap with both merits briefs filed in that case. The 
high level of difference between the amounts of language the 
opinions share with one merits brief relative to the other is 
telling in that it is not merely uncontested statements and 
quotations that form the basis of the shared language. Although 
it is beyond the scope of this article to dissect the psychology of 
the Justices in an attempt to uncover whether the briefs cause the 
Justices to utilize the same language, or if the Justices simply 
share the opinions of the brief writer, the examples of 
relationships predicated on lifted language show the extent of 
the role briefs can play in opinion construction. 
 44. This is underscored by the fact that the length of opinions has generally grown in 
recent years. See, e.g., Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs, An Empirical Analysis of the 
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First I examine Common Source, Shared Understanding, 
and Traditional Impact brief-to-opinion relationships. Then I 
juxtapose these with the relationship of most interest: the Lifted 
brief-to-opinion relationship. 
D. Common Source Relationships 
(High Percentage Overlap, Low Word Overlap) 
The case in the dataset with the highest percentage overlap 
between a brief and opinion is Ashton v. Kentucky,45 an opinion 
for the Court authored by Justice Douglas that shares fifty-nine 
percent of its language and 850 of its 1430 words with the brief 
for the petitioner.46 The opinion in this case is typical of the 
Common Source type, as the overlapping language is primarily 
based on shared citations. At one point in this opinion, for 
example, 434 continuously shared words—more than fifty 
percent of the shared language—derive from the pamphlet that 
led to the libel claim at the heart of the case, which is lengthily 
quoted in both brief and opinion. 
Aside from this long shared citation, the Court and the 
petitioner’s brief also rely on many of the same cases. The Court 
analogizes to Cantwell v. Connecticut,47 in which interpretation 
of a related statute was required. The Ashton opinion and the 
petitioner’s brief both note that the Cantwell Court stated that 
“[the] offense known as breach of the peace embraces a great 
variety of conduct destroying or menacing public order and 
tranquility. It includes not only violent acts but acts and words 
likely to produce violence in others.”48 Both quote Cantwell for 
what was problematic in the law: “Here we have a situation 
analogous to a conviction under a statute sweeping in a great 
variety of conduct under a general and indefinite 
characterization, and leaving to the executive and judicial 
 45. 384 U.S. 195 (1966). 
 46. This is a Common Source opinion because, although the percentage overlap is high, 
the number of overlapping words is below the 1,000 word threshold. See Table 1, supra
page 33, and accompanying text. 
 47. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
 48. Ashton, 384 U.S. at 199 (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308); Brief for Petitioner at 
24, Ashton v. Kentucky, 1966 WL 115462 (U.S. Mar 14, 1966) (No. 619) (same) 
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branches too wide a discretion.”49 Comparisons in such cases 
may suggest that a party thought along the same lines as the 
Justices and clerks, although it sheds little light on whether the 
brief made a significant impact on the opinion writer or writers. 
Common Source opinions can mirror Lifted opinions more 
closely, although they generally do not display the same overall 
similitude between brief and opinion as found in Lifted 
instances. An example of this sort of relationship can be found 
in Bulova Watch Company v. United States.50 Justice 
Whittaker’s opinion for the Court in Bulova shares forty-eight 
percent of its language (861 words) with the SG’s brief. The 
brief in this instance was written by the Office of the Solicitor 
General (OSG) under the direction of SG Archibald Cox, and 
the SG’s presence is often an indicator that the Court will rely 
on the brief’s language, especially when the views expressed in 
it accord with the Justices’ positions on the issues. The Bulova
opinion relies on the SG’s brief for its depiction of the 
petitioner’s argument: 
Even if petitioner were correct in 
stating that Section 2411(a) is to 
be regarded as the later 
enactment, it would not follow 
that it would take precedence, for 
it has been frequently held that a 
specific statute over-rides a 
general statute “without regard to 
priority of enactment.” Townsend
v. Little, 109 U.S. 504, 512. More 
than that, however, the premise of 
the argument is erroneous. At the 
time Section 3771(e) was enacted 
(in 1942), a predecessor provision 
of Section 2411(a) had long been 
on the books. Save for one word 
of no possible significance, this 
predecessor provision (Section 
Petitioner further contends that 
§2411(a) is a later enactment than 
§3771(e) and, for that reason, 
should take precedence over it. 
We do not believe that §2411(a) 
can fairly be regarded as a later 
enactment than § 3771(e), for at 
the time § 3771(e) was enacted, 
in 1942, a predecessor provision 
of § 2411(a) had long been on the 
books. Save for the word 
“hereby”—of no possible 
significance—that predecessor 
provision (§177(b) of the Judicial 
Code, 28 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) 
§284(b) was identical with the 
present §2411(a). But even if 
petitioner were correct in 
49. Ashton, 384 at 199 (quoting Cantwell); Ashton Brief, supra note 48, at 24 (same). 
As this analogy is not in the State’s favor, it does not appear in Kentucky’s brief. 
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177(b) of the Judicial Code, 28 
U.S.C., 1940 ed., Section 284(b)) 
was identical in terms with the 
present Section 2411(a).51
concluding that § 2411(a) is to be 
regarded as the later enactment, it 
would not necessarily take 
precedence over § 3711(e), for it 
is familiar law that a specific 
statute controls over a general one 
“without regard to priority of 
enactment.” Townsend v. Little,
109 U.S. 504, 512.52
In the above example, the Court uses the same reasoning as the 
SG to explain both why the petitioner was incorrect in that 
instance as well as why § 2411(a) is not necessarily a later 
enactment than § 3771(e).  
Elsewhere, the opinion shares language with the SG’s brief 
in interpreting the Congressional intent behind § 3771(e). Both 
rely on the same report from the Senate Finance Committee: 
From this statement, it is apparent 
that Congress proposed (1) to 
deny interest up to the date that a 
carry-back could be determined 
and (2) to prevent, through delay 
in the presentation of claims, the 
accumulation of interest after that 
date.53
This surely shows Congress’ 
purpose to deny interest on carry-
back refunds for any period prior 
to the time they could be 
determined, and also to prevent, 
through delay in the presentation 
of claims, the accumulation of 
interest after that date and prior to 
the filing of the claim.54
There are several other instances of extensive language 
sharing between the SG’s brief and the Court’s opinion in 
Bulova, mainly dealing with the interpretation of relevant 
precedent. With its instances of shared substantive language 
between brief and opinion, Bulova presents an example of how 
Common Source opinions may share Lifted opinion 
characteristics on a smaller scale. 
51. Brief for the United States at 10, Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 1961 WL 
101948 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1961) (No. 241) [hereinafter Bulova Brief]. 
 52. Bulova, 365 U.S. at 758. 
 53. Bulova Brief, supra note 51, at 16. 
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E. Shared Understanding (Low Percentage Overlap, High 
Words Overlap) and Traditional Impact (Low Percentage 
Overlap, Low Words Overlap) Examples 
Shared Understanding opinions are more frequent of late, 
as lengthier opinions allow for relationships in which the overall 
number of shared words is on the higher end of the spectrum, 
although nowhere near the thirty-three percent overlapping-
language threshold. Four have the highest level of word overlap 
during the early Roberts period, and two are on the high end of 
percentage language overlap as well. The first is Graham v. 
Florida,55 in which Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the 
Court analyzing the constitutionality of imposing a life sentence 
on a juvenile. Twelve percent of the opinion—1,327 words—
overlaps with the petitioner’s brief. But the shared language, 
often salient to the Court’s analysis, does not originate with the 
petitioner’s brief. It comes from common sources: 
First, juveniles possess less 
maturity and an underdeveloped 
sense of responsibility, which 
often results in impetuous and ill-
considered actions and decisions. 
Second, juveniles are more 
vulnerable and susceptible to 
negative influences and outside 
pressures, including peer 
pressure.56
As compared to adults, juveniles 
have a ‘‘‘lack of maturity and an 
underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility’”; they “are more 
vulnerable or susceptible to 
negative influences and outside 
pressures, including peer 
pressure”; and their characters are 
“not as well formed.”57
In fact, even expert psychologists 
cannot reliably “differentiate 
between the juvenile offender 
whose crime reflects unfortunate 
yet transient immaturity, and the 
rare juvenile offender whose 
These salient characteristics mean 
that “[i]t is difficult even for expert
psychologists to differentiate 
between the juvenile offender 
whose crime reflects unfortunate 
yet transient immaturity, and the 
 55. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 56. Brief for Petitioner at 26, Graham v. Florida, 2009 WL 2159655 (U.S. July 16, 
2009) (No. 08-7412) (discussing conclusions reached in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 
(2005)) [hereinafter Graham Brief]. 
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crime reflects irreparable 
corruption.” Id. at 573.58
rare juvenile offender whose 
crime reflects irreparable 
corruption.” Id., at 573.59
Thus, the shared language in Graham is integral to the 
Court’s decision. It supports the notion that the imposition of a 
life sentence violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment, which was the Court’s ultimate 
conclusion. Still, the overlapping language primarily stems from 
a common source, so it cannot be determined if Justice Kennedy 
and his clerks utilized the language due to the brief’s persuasive 
powers or due to a common acknowledgement of the importance 
of the wording from the precedent that they both cited. 
Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court in 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,60 shares twelve percent of 
its language—1,359 words—with the SG’s brief. As in Graham,
however, there are several instances of meaningful shared 
language from shared sources, all of which relate in this case to 
whether a federal statute is unconstitutionally vague. Examples 
of such shared language include: 
This Court has repeatedly 
observed that “perfect clarity and 
precise guidance have never been 
required even of regulations that 
restrict expressive activity.” Ward 
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 
U.S. 781, 794 (1989).61
“But ‘perfect clarity and precise 
guidance have never been 
required even of regulations that 
restrict expressive activity.’” 
Williams, supra, at 304, . . .  
(quoting Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. 781 . . . (1989)).62
The statute does not prohibit 
independent advocacy or 
expression of any kind.63
“The statute does not prohibit 
independent advocacy or 
expression of any kind.”64
 58. Graham Brief, supra note 56, at 49. 
59. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68. 
 60. 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 61. Brief for Respondents at 18, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 2009 WL 
4951303 (U.S. Dec. 22, 2009) (No. 08-1498) [hereinafter Humanitarian Law Brief]. 
62. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 19. 
 63. Humanitarian Law Brief, supra note 61, at 13.
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In both Graham and Humanitarian Law Project, there is no 
question of the source of the language. Even with the same 
propositions supporting the arguments in the opinions and the 
briefs, there is attribution to the proper sources. But the role of 
the briefs in fashioning the language for the opinions is not 
entirely clear outside of the instances in which the opinions cite 
the briefs. 
Next is Pepper v. United States,65 in which Justice 
Sotomayor’s opinion for the Court deals with resentencing. With 
1,784 overlapping words and twenty-two percent overlap 
between the opinion and the respondent’s brief, this case ranks 
high on the list of overall word overlap. As is typical for Shared 
Understanding cases, the shared language in this case primarily 
revolves around shared citations to precedent. Even with the 
high level of overlapping words in Pepper, the overlapping 
language is dispersed about the opinion and the sections of 
overlapping language are not as dense as is typical in Lifted 
scenarios. Some examples of shared language in Pepper
meaningful to the Court’s conclusion include: 
It has been a “uniform and 
constant” principle of the federal 
sentencing tradition that the 
sentencing court will “consider 
every convicted person as an 
individual and every case as a 
unique study in the human 
failings that sometimes mitigate, 
sometimes magnify, the crime 
and the punishment to ensue.”66
“It has been uniform and constant 
in the federal judicial tradition for 
the sentencing judge to consider 
every convicted person as an 
individual and every case as a 
unique study in the human 
failings that sometimes mitigate, 
sometimes magnify, the crime 
and the punishment to ensue.” 
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 
81, 113.67
Section 3577 permitted a 
sentencing judge in determining 
the appropriate punishment to 
Both Congress and the 
Sentencing Commission thus 
expressly preserved the 
 65. 562 U.S. 476 (2011). 
 66. Brief for the United States at 30, Pepper v. United States, 2010 WL 3426283 (U.S. 
Aug. 31, 2010) (No. 09-6822) (citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996)) 
[hereinafter Pepper Brief]. 
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“conduct an inquiry broad in 
scope, largely unlimited either as 
to the kind of information he may 
consider, or the source from 
which it may come.” United 
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 
446 (1972).68
traditional discretion of 
sentencing courts to “conduct an 
inquiry broad in scope, largely 
unlimited either as to the kind of 
information [they] may consider, 
or the source from which it may 
come.” United States v. Tucker, 
404 U.S. 443, 446.69
One recent Shared Understanding case shows how the 
delineation between the relationships in these cases and Lifted 
relationships is not always clear. Justice Thomas’s opinion for 
the Court in Marx v. General Revenue Corporation70 includes 
1198 overlapping words, or a twenty-five percent overall 
overlap between the opinion and the respondent’s brief. 
Although the majority of the shared language tracks typical 
Shared Understanding examples, two instances of shared 
language in Marx are quite similar to the type of overlap 
typically particular to Lifted opinions. 
In the first example from Marx, the opinion shares 
language from the respondent’s brief to strengthen a legal 
argument: 
68. Pepper Brief, supra note 66, at 32. 
 69. Pepper, 562 U.S. at 489. 
 70. ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1166 (2013). 
 71. Brief for Respondent at 15–16, Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 2012 WL 3945843 
(U.S. Sept. 10, 2012) (No. 11-1175) [hereinafter Marx Brief]. 
72. Marx, 133 S. Ct. at 1176. 
By adding “and costs” to the 
second sentence, Congress 
foreclosed the argument that, 
under expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius, the expression of costs in 
the first sentence and exclusion of 
the same term in the second 
meant that defendants could 
recover only attorney’s fees, and 
not costs.71
If Congress had excluded “and 
costs” in the second sentence, 
plaintiffs might have argued that 
the expression of costs in the first 
sentence and the exclusion of 
costs in the second meant that 
defendants could only recover 
attorney’s fees when plaintiffs 
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In this instance the opinion and brief use the same tools of 
statutory interpretation to gain leverage on Congressional intent 
for recovering costs and attorney fees. The matching language 
likely presents a situation in which the argument from the brief 
was used as a template for the analysis in the opinion, something 
that is prevalent in Lifted opinions. Comparing the brief and the 
opinion suggests the brief as the likely source of the language in 
the opinion. 
The next example from Marx is something atypical in non-
Lifted cases: an extensive passage for which a brief was almost 
assuredly used as a basis for the language in the opinion. Not 
only is there considerable overlapping language throughout the 
passage, but even the non-overlapping language expresses the 
same points in the same sequence: 
The canon against superfluity 
should particularly give way 
when “excess language” is 
“hardly unusual.” Microsoft, 131 
S. Ct. at 2249. A myriad of 
statutes overlap with Rule 54(d). 
E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 2607(d)(5) (Real 
Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
of 1974) (“the court may award to 
the prevailing party the court 
costs of the action”); 12 U.S.C. § 
5565(b) (Consumer Financial 
Protection Act of 2010) (“the 
[Consumer Financial Protection] 
Bureau . . . may recover its costs 
in connection with prosecuting 
such action if [it] is the prevailing 
party in the action”); 15 U.S.C. § 
6104(d) (Telemarketing and 
Consumer Fraud and Abuse 
Prevention Act) (“[t]he court . . . 
may award costs of suit and 
reasonable fees for attorneys and 
expert witnesses to the prevailing 
party”); 15 U.S.C. § 7706(f)(4) 
Second, redundancy is “hardly 
unusual” in statutes addressing 
costs. See id., at. . . . 131 S. Ct. 
2238, 180 L. Ed. 2d 131. 
Numerous statutes overlap with 
Rule 54(d)(1). See, e.g., 12 U.S.C 
§2607(d)(5) (“[T]he court may 
award to the prevailing party the 
court costs of the action”); 
§5565(b) (2006 ed., Supp. V) 
(“the [Consumer Financial 
Protection]Bureau . . . may 
recover its costs in connection 
with prosecuting such action if 
[it] . . . is the prevailing party in 
the action”); 15 U.S.C §6104(d) 
(2006 ed.) (“The court . . . may 
award costs of suit and reasonable 
fees for attorneys and expert 
witnesses to the prevailing 
party”); §7706(f)(4) (“In the case 
of any successful action . . . the 
court, in its discretion, may award 
the costs of the action”); 
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(Controlling the Assault of Non-
Solicited Pornography and 
Marketing Act) (“[i]n the case of 
any successful action . . . the 
court, in its discretion, may award 
the costs of the action”); 15 
U.S.C. § 7805(b)(3) (Sports 
Agent Responsibility and Trust 
Act) (“the court may award to the 
prevailing party costs”); 15 U.S.C.
§ 8131(2) (Anti-Cybersquatting 
Consumer Protection Act) (“[t]he 
court may also, in its discretion, 
award costs and attorneys’ fees to 
the prevailing party”); 29 U.S.C. 
§ 431(c) (Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act) 
(“[t]he court . . . may, in its 
discretion . . . allow a reasonable 
attorney’s fee to be paid by the 
defendant, and costs of the 
action”); 42 U.S.C. § 3612(p) 
(Fair Housing Act) (“the court . . . 
in its discretion, may allow the 
prevailing party . . . a reasonable 
attorney’s fee and costs”); 42 
U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (Fair Housing 
Act) (“the court, in its discretion, 
may allow the prevailing party 
. . . a reasonable attorney’s fee 
and costs”); 47 U.S.C. § 551(f)(2) 
(Communications Act) (“[t]he 
court may award . . . other 
litigation costs reasonably 
incurred”).73
award to the prevailing party 
costs”); §8131(2) (2006 ed., 
Supp. V) (“The court may also, in 
its discretion, award costs and 
attorneys’ fees to the prevailing 
party”); 29 U.S.C §431(c) (2006 
ed.) (“The court . . . may, in its 
discretion . . . allow a reasonable 
attorney’s fee to be paid by the 
defendant, and costs of the 
action”); 42 U.S.C §3612(p) 
(“[T]he court . . . in its discretion, 
may allow the prevailing party ... 
a reasonable attorney's fee and 
costs”); § 3613(c)(2) (“[T]he 
court, in its discretion, may allow 
the prevailing party . . . a 
reasonable attorney's fee and 
costs”); 47 U.S.C. § 551(f)(2) 
(“[T]he court may award . . . 
other litigation costs reasonably 
incurred”). . . . a reasonable 
attorney’s fee and costs”); 
§3613(c)(2) (“[T]he court, in its 
discretion, may allow the 
prevailing party .  .  . a reasonable 
attorney’s fee and costs”); 47 
U.S.C §551(f)(2) (“[T]he court 
may award . . . other litigation 
costs reasonably incurred”).74
 73. Marx Brief, supra note 71, at 24–25. 
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Marx thus presents an instance in which the brief provided a 
template for the Court opinion. The opinion tracks the brief’s 
lengthy phrases in meaning and uses the same references. Much 
of the overlap is through shared citations, but the similarity 
between passages makes it unlikely that the brief’s wording did 
not play a large role in shaping the language in the opinion. 
Traditional Impact opinions, the most common in the 
dataset, can look like Shared Understanding opinions, but with 
less shared language. Although they also may occasionally share 
characteristics of Lifted opinions, the shared language tends to 
be sparse, so it is more difficult to decipher the extent of the 
impact (if any) that the brief made on the opinion’s content. 
Scrutiny of Kloeckner v. Solis,75 for example, shows that the 
brief in that case affected the opinion’s content here: 
Section 7702(a)(3) defines for the 
most part which MSPB decisions 
qualify as “judicially reviewable 
action[s],” providing that “[a]ny 
decision of the Board under 
paragraph (1) of this subsection 
shall be a judicially reviewable 
action as of” the date of the 
decision.”76
That provision, the Government 
states, “defines for the most part 
which MSPB decisions qualify as 
‘judicially reviewable actions[s]’” 
by “providing that ‘[a]ny decision 
of the Board under paragraph (1) 
of this subsection shall be a 
judicially reviewable action as of’ 
the date of the decision.”77
And here: 
The purpose of the provision is to 
save employees from being held 
in perpetual uncertainty by Board 
inaction.78
That provision, as the 
Government notes, is designed 
“to save employees from being 
held in perpetual uncertainty by 
Board inaction.”79
 75. ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 596 (2012). 
 76. Brief for Respondent at 21, Kloeckner v. Solis, 2012 WL 2883261 (U. S. July 13, 
2012) (No. 11-184) [hereinafter Kloeckner Brief]. 
77. Kloeckner, 133 S. Ct. at 605 (citing Kloeckner Brief). 
 78. Kloeckner Brief, supra note 76, at 28.
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In the more recent cases, we tend to see the largest impact 
of a brief when it is cited in the opinion. Although shared 
citations to precedent are common, instances of shared language 
similar to the lengthy passage in Marx80 are not due to the lower 
percentage of overlapping language and fewer overlapping 
words in relationships of Traditional Impact like those found in 
Kloeckner. In Kloeckner, as in many other cases from the last 
several decades, opinions tend to attribute unoriginal language 
to a source internal or external to the case itself. With Lifted 
opinions, such attribution typically is not present. 
F. Lifted Relationships 
(High Percentage Overlap and High Word Overlap) 
The briefs in Lifted relationships play a greater role than 
merely persuading Justices to vote a certain way. These are 
cases in which the briefs ultimately affect the Court’s assertions, 
its assessments of the facts, and the outcome of the law to be 
applied in future cases. Table 2 below breaks each opinion down 
into its composite sections dealing with facts and law, and 
measures the percentage of opinion language from each section 
that overlaps with the relevant merits brief. This dichotomy 
points to opinions in which the briefs impact the recitation of 
facts versus those for which the briefs are an aid in the 
construction of law and in the Court’s legal reasoning.
It should not be surprising that one of the most trusted 
litigants before the Court, the SG, was the author of all but two 
of the briefs in cases with Lifted opinions. The examples below 
that include the SG’s brief not only show high levels of 
similarity due to shared citations, but also due to large quantities 
of text shared between the briefs and opinions, and yet the 
opinions lack any form of attribution to the briefs. 
The chronological chain of Supreme Court decisionmaking 
strengthens the probability that the briefs played a decisive role 
in the opinion language. The briefs predate the opinions and are 
circulated among the Justices. The Justices and clerks gain 
valuable information about the case through the briefs. As the 
cases show, the voice and rhetorical devices in the opinion 
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language are sufficiently similar to those in the briefs to suggest 
a decisive role for the briefs. It is difficult to conceive of another 
source that could provide both the opinion writer and the brief 
writer with the same material at this frequency. The 
constructions of the facts and arguments in these opinions share 
the tone of the briefs, with the highly overlapping language 
leading the opinions to echo arguments made by the brief 
writers. This goes beyond the neutral language we might expect 
to find from a shared source and is often instead pointed 
language that parallels the arguments made in the briefs. There 
tends to be little in the way of attribution in these opinions to 
any source, although the similarity between the language in the 
briefs and opinions makes it nearly impossible to conclude that 
the language in the opinions did not derive from the briefs. 
As Table 2 (which appears on the next page) shows, there 
is generally a large portion of both facts and law shared between 
the opinions and briefs. The briefs in these cases impact the 
Court’s reasoning as do the recitations of facts likely derived 
from the case records. Only two cases fall below twenty percent 
overlap in the area of the opinions’ legal reasoning, suggesting 
that the Court typically tends to rely on the briefs’ presentations 
of both law and facts.81
 81. Because a detailed examination of each case in this list would require hundreds of 
pages, I attempt in the following discussion to distill the most salient and relevant shared 
passages between the briefs and opinions. And because the extent of the similarity between 
Lifted opinions and briefs is helpful in understanding the impact of the briefs on the 
opinions, and appreciating how in many instances the briefs are templates for many parts of 
the opinions, I provide an online appendix that includes each opinion in full, highlighted to 
show the language shared with the lifted brief. See Adam Feldman, All Copying Is Not 
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Table 2 
Impact of Brief on Opinion Language
Justice Term Case Party Facts/Law Words Total
Warren 1955 Steiner (SG brief) Resp 71/14% 1,015 53% 
Goldberg 1963 Tilton (SG brief) Pet 43/44% 1,187 44% 
Warren 1963 Foti (SG brief) Resp 43/30% 1,119 34% 
Marshall 1975 Train (SG brief) Pet 29/33% 1,466 32% 
Blackmun 1977 MacDonald (SG brief) Pet 30/46% 1,395 42% 
Blackmun 1979 Lewis (SG brief) Resp 35/38% 1,036 40% 
Blackmun 1980 DiFrancesco (SG brief) Pet 41/28% 1,921 33% 
Marshall 1980 Hodel (SG brief) Pet 56/37% 1,675 43% 
Stewart 1980 Lehman (SG brief) Pet 22/50% 1,141 43% 
Stewart 1980 Carter Pet 48/32% 1,427 41% 
White 1980 Valencia Pet 50/30% 1,153 35% 
Blackmun 1982 New Banner (SG brief) Pet 55/38% 1,975 43% 
Blackmun 1983 Russello (SG brief) Resp 33/55% 1821 51% 
Burger 1983 89 Firearms (SG brief) Pet 28/38% 1,178 38% 
Blackmun 1984 Nat’l Bank (SG brief) Pet 43/51% 2,216 50% 
Blackmun 1985 Hughes (SG brief) Pet 37/28% 1,108 33% 
Powell 1986 Yuckert (SG brief) Pet 39/49% 1,446 43% 
Blackmun 1987 Egan (SG brief) Pet 60/47% 1,955 52% 
Blackmun 1989 Doe Agency (SG brief) Pet 44/38% 1,097 42% 
Blackmun 1989 U. Penn (SG brief) Resp 53/25% 1,555 33% 
Blackmun 1992 Keystone (SG brief) Pet 39/37% 1,010 39% 
Blackmun 1993 Posters N’ Things (SG brief) Resp 54/38% 1,178 41% 
Often even the non-overlapping language in the opinions is 
so closely related to the language in the briefs that it would be 
difficult to make a compelling argument that the author of the 
opinion did not lift the language and argument from the brief, 
simply exchanging a few words for their synonyms in the 
process.
1. Blackmun Cases 
Justice Blackmun, more than any other member of the 
Court, showed a high level of willingness to engage the SG’s 
arguments and to parallel the SG’s reasoning and language 
throughout his opinions for the Court. This relationship is 
underscored by its continuity throughout his career on the Court. 
While no other justice authored more than two Lifted opinions 
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authored twelve from 1977 through 1993. Due to the high 
percentage of Lifted opinions Justice Blackmun authored, I 
discuss his Lifted opinions first, and then those authored by 
other Justices. 
The first Lifted opinion authored by Justice Blackmun for 
the Court is United States v. MacDonald.82 As Table 2 shows, 
almost fifty percent of the opinion’s discussion of the law 
overlaps with the brief filed in that case by the SG. The opinion 
clearly follows the brief for the assessment of the applicable 
caselaw, as can be seen here: 
This Court has twice departed in 
criminal cases from the general 
prohibition against piecemeal 
appellate review, invoking on 
both occasions the so-called 
“collateral order” exception to the 
final judgment rule, first 
announced in Cohen v. Beneficial 
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 
541, 545–547.83
This Court in criminal cases has 
twice departed from the general 
prohibition against piecemeal 
appellate review. Abney v. United 
States, supra; Stack v. Boyle, 342 
U.S. 1, 72 S. Ct. 1, 96 L. Ed. 3 
(1951). In each instance, the 
Court relied on the final-
judgment rule’s “collateral order” 
exception articulated in Cohen v. 
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541, 545–547, 69 S. Ct. 
1221, 1225–1226, 93 L. Ed. 1528 
(1949).84
Here:
Like the denial of a motion to 
dismiss an indictment on double 
jeopardy grounds, a pretrial order 
rejecting a defendant’s speedy 
trial claim plainly “lacks the 
finality traditionally considered 
indispensable to appellate review” 
(Abney v. United States, supra, 
Like the denial of a motion to 
dismiss an indictment on double 
jeopardy grounds, a pretrial order 
rejecting a defendant’s speedy 
trial claim plainly “lacks the 
finality traditionally considered 
indispensable to appellate 
review,” Abney v. United States,
 82. 435 U.S. 850 (1978). 
 83. Brief for the United States at *27, United States v. MacDonald, 1977 WL 189842 
(U.S. Sept. 7, 1977) (No. 75-1892) [hereinafter MacDonald Brief].
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slip op. 7). Hence, if such orders 
may be appealed prior to trial, it
must be because they satisfy the 
restrictive qualifications identified 
in Cohen and Abney as sufficient 
to justify dispensing with the 
normal rules against piecemeal 
review before final judgment. . . . 
[T]he same cannot be said of the 
denial of a pretrial motion to 
dismiss an indictment on speedy 
trial grounds.85
431 U.S., at 659, 97 S. Ct., at 
2040, that is, such an order 
obviously is not final in the sense 
of terminating the criminal 
proceedings in the trial court. 
Thus, if such an order may be 
appealed before trial, it is because 
it satisfies the criteria identified 
in Cohen and Abney as sufficient 
to warrant suspension of the 
established rules against 
piecemeal review before final 
judgment. . . . We believe it clear 
that an order denying a motion to 
dismiss an indictment on speedy 
trial grounds does not satisfy 
those criteria.86
And here: 
We are aware of only two other 
federal cases in which a 
defendant has sought pretrial 
appellate review of an order 
denying his motion to dismiss the 
indictment because of an alleged 
violation of the Sixth Amendment 
right to a speedy trial, and in both 
instances the court of appeals 
held that it lacked jurisdiction to 
consider the claim prior to 
conviction. See United States v. 
Bailey, 512 F. 2d 833 (C.A. 5), 
certiorari dismissed, 423 U.S. 
1039; Kyle v. United States, 211 
F. 2d 912 (C.A. 9).87
In keeping with what appear to be 
the only two other federal cases 
in which a defendant has sought 
pretrial review of an order 
denying his motion to dismiss an 
indictment on speedy trial 
grounds, we hold that the Court 
of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to 
entertain respondent’s speedy 
trial appeal. United States v. 
Bailey, 512 F.2d 833 (CA5), cert. 
dism’d, 423 U.S. 1039, 96 S. Ct. 
578, 46 L.Ed.2d 415 (1975); Kyle
v. United States, 211 F.2d 912 
(CA9 1954).88
 85. MacDonald Brief, supra note 83, at *30–*31.
86. MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 857.
 87. MacDonald Brief, supra note 83, at *23–*24. 





      11/10/2016   09:41:10
38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 29 Side B      11/10/2016   09:41:10
FELDMANRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2016 12:38 PM
50 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
The opinion’s conclusion also parallels the petitioner’s 
brief:
[T]he important policy 
considerations that underlie 
both the Speedy Trial Clause 
and the statutory bar to 
piecemeal appeals in criminal 
cases strongly suggest that 
speedy trial motions are the 
least appropriate subject for 
interlocutoryappellatereview.
. . . . . 
This Court has recognized that 
one of the principal reasons for its 
strict adherence to the doctrine of 
finality in criminal cases is that 
“[t]he Sixth Amendment 
guarantees a speedy trial.” 
DiBella v. United States, supra,
369 U.S. at 126. The . . . 
compelling societal interest in the 
swift punishment of the guilty 
and the prompt exoneration of the 
innocent . . . would be severely 
compromised if every contested 
legal question arising in the 
course of a criminal proceeding 
could be resolved in a separate 
appeal before trial of the general 
issue.89
Our conclusion, however, is 
reinforced by the important 
policy considerations that 
underlie both the Speedy Trial 
Clause and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
. . . . .
Significantly, this Court has 
emphasized that one of the 
principal reasons for its strict 
adherence to the doctrine of 
finality in criminal cases is that 
“[t]he Sixth Amendment 
guarantees a speedy trial.” Di 
Bella v. United States, 369 U.S., 
at 126, 82 S. Ct., at 658. 
Fulfillment of this guarantee 
would be impossible if every 
pretrial order were appealable.90
Lewis v. United States,91 Justice Blackmun’s second Lifted 
opinion for the Court, uses the SG’s construction of the statute 
in question as the basis for the resolution of the case and for the 
 89. MacDonald Brief, supra note 83, at *43–*44. 
90. MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 861.
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reasoning to support it. The following passages present some 
examples: 
In our view, this particular 
omission is especially indicative 
of congressional intent, since 
other federal statutes involving 
prior convictions explicitly 
permit the accused to challenge 
the validity or constitutionality of 
the predicate felony as a defense. 
See Section 411(c)(2) of the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act of 
1970.92
It thus stands in contrast with 
other federal statutes that 
explicitly permit a defendant to 
challenge, by way of defense, the 
validity or constitutionality of the 
predicate felony. See, e. g., 18 U. 
S. C. § 3575(e) (dangerous 
special offender) and 21 U. S. C. 
§ 851(c)(2) (recidivism under the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act of 
1970).93
The structure of Title IV of the 
Omnibus Act, which was enacted 
simultaneously with Title VII, 
reinforces that conclusion. Like 
Title VII, Title IV prohibits 
various categories of 
presumptively dangerous persons 
from transporting and receiving 
firearms. 18 U.S.C. 922 (g) and 
922(h). . . .  Thus, with regard to 
the statutory question at issue 
here, there is no significant 
difference between title IV and 
Title VII. Both statutes seek to 
keep firearms away from “any 
person . . . who has been 
convicted . . .” of a felony.94
The very structure of the 
Omnibus Act’s Title IV, enacted 
simultaneously with Title VII, 
reinforces this conclusion. Each 
Title prohibits categories of 
presumptively dangerous persons 
from transporting or receiving 
firearms. See 18 U. S. C. §§ 922 
(g) and (h). Actually, with regard 
to the statutory question at issue 
here, we detect little significant 
difference between Title IV and 
Title VII. Each seeks to keep a 
firearm away from “any person 
 . . . who has been convicted” of a 
felony.95
 92. Brief for United States at *17–*18, Lewis v. United States, 1979 WL 213815 (Nov. 
3, 1979) (No. 78-1595) [hereinafter Lewis Brief]. 
93. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 62. 
 94. Lewis Brief, supra note 92, at *24–*25. 
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Congress rationally concluded 
that any felony conviction—even 
an allegedly invalid one—is a 
sufficient basis on which to 
prohibit the possession of 
firearms. See, e.g., United States 
v. Samson, supra, 533 F.2d at 
722; United States v. Ransom,
515 F.2d 885, 891–892 (5th Cir. 
1975). . . . 96
Congress could rationally 
conclude that any felony 
conviction, even an allegedly 
invalid one, is a sufficient basis 
on which to prohibit the 
possession of a firearm. See, e. g., 
United States v. Ransom, 515 
F.2d 885, 891–892.97
The express congressional 
purpose in enacting Title VII is 
set forth in the statute itself. [T]he 
receipt, possession, or 
transportation of a firearm by 
felons constitutes . . . a threat to 
the continued and effective 
operation of the Government of 
the United States. . . . 18 U.S.C. 
App. 1201. . . . [T]he legislative 
history of the gun control laws 
“evidences Congress’ deep 
concern about the easy 
availability of firearms, especially 
to those who . . . pose a greater 
threat to community peace. . . .” 
And . . . Congress focused on the 
substantial nexus between violent 
crimes and the possession of 
firearms by “any person who has 
a criminal record.” 114 Cong. 
Rec. 13220 (1968) (remarks of 
Sen. Tydings); . . . 16298 
(remarks of Rep. Pollock).98
Congress, as its expressed 
purpose in enacting Title VII 
reveals, 18 U. S. C. App. §1201, 
was concerned that the receipt 
and possession of a firearm by a 
felon constitutes a threat, among 
other things, to the continued and 
effective operation of the 
Government of the United States. 
The legislative history of the gun 
control laws discloses Congress’ 
worry about the easy availability 
of firearms, especially to those 
persons who pose a threat to 
community peace. And Congress 
focused on the nexus between 
violent crime and the possession 
of a firearm by any person with a 
criminal record. 114 Cong. Rec. 
13220 (1968) (remarks of Sen. 
Tydings); . . . 16298 (remarks of 
Rep. Pollock)99
 96. Lewis Brief, supra note 92, at *41. 
97. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 66. 
 98. Lewis Brief, supra note 92, at *40–*41. 
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The Lewis Court also follows the SG’s rationale for the 
rejection of petitioner’s construction of the relevant statute: 
“[R]esort to an alternative 
construction to avoid deciding a 
constitutional question is 
appropriate only when such a 
course is ‘fairly possible’ or when 
the statute provides a ‘fair 
alternative’ construction.” Swain
v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 378 
n.11 (1977).100
With the face of the statute and 
the legislative history so clear, 
petitioner’s argument that the 
statute nevertheless should be 
construed so as to avoid a 
constitutional issue is inapposite. 
That course is appropriate only 
when the statute provides a fair 
alternative construction. This 
statute could not be more plain. 
Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 373, 
378, and n. 11.101
And finally the opinion adopts, nearly verbatim, the SG’s 
assessment of the Court’s own precedent: 
And this Court has repeatedly 
recognized that a legislature may 
constitutionally prohibit convicted 
felons from engaging in activities 
far more fundamental than the 
right to possess firearms at issue 
here. See Richardson v. Ramirez,
418 U.S. 24 (1974) 
(disenfranchisement of felons); 
DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 
144, 157-160 (1960) (felons 
barred from waterfront 
employment); Hawker v. New 
York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) [58] 
(prohibition on medical practice 
by a felon).102
This Court has recognized 
repeatedly that a legislature 
constitutionally may prohibit a 
convicted felon from engaging in 
activities far more fundamental 
than the possession of a firearm. 
See Richardson v. Ramirez,
418 U.S. 24 (1974) 
(disenfranchisement); DeVeau v. 
Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) 
(proscription against holding 
office in a waterfront labor 
organization); Hawker v. New 
York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) 
(prohibition against the practice 
of medicine).103
 100. Lewis Brief, supra note 92, at *36.
 101. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 65. 
 102. Lewis Brief, supra note 92, at *42. 
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To be sure, the Court has made 
clear that an outstanding 
uncounselled felony conviction 
cannot reliably be used for certain 
purposes. See Burgett v. Texas,
389 U.S. 109 (1967); United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 
(1972); Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 
473 (1972). But the Court has 
never suggested that an 
uncounselled conviction is 
invalid for all purposes (see, e.g.,
Scott v. Illinois, supra).104
We recognize, of course, that 
under the Sixth Amendment an 
uncounseled felony conviction 
cannot be used for certain 
purposes. See Burgett, Tucker,
and Loper, all supra. The Court, 
however, has never suggested that 
an uncounseled conviction is 
invalid for all purposes. See Scott
v. Illinois.105
In each of those cases this Court 
found that the conviction or 
sentence in question violated the 
Sixth Amendment because it 
depended upon the reliability of a 
particular uncounselled conviction
in the past. The federal gun laws, 
however, focus on the mere fact 
of conviction, regardless of its 
reliability, in order to keep 
firearms away from potentially 
dangerous people.106
In each of those cases, this Court 
found that the subsequent 
conviction or sentence violated 
the Sixth Amendment because it 
depended upon the reliability of a 
past uncounseled conviction. The 
federal gun laws, however, focus 
not on reliability, but on the mere 
fact of conviction, or even 
indictment, in order to keep 
firearms away from potentially 
dangerous persons.107
The high level of similarity between the SG’s brief and the 
opinion in Lewis reinforces the conclusion that the trust and faith 
that Justice Blackmun and his clerks placed in the SG makes 
Lifted opinions more likely in cases involving the SG. This 
pattern continues through the remainder of Justice Blackmun’s 
Lifted opinions for the Court, which all rely heavily on the 
language from the SG’s briefs. 
 104. Lewis Brief, supra note 92, at *45. 
 105. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 66–67. 
 106. Lewis Brief, supra note 92, at *48.
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DiFrancesco v. United States,108 is yet another Blackmun 
opinion for the Court in which the opinion language parallels 
that in the SG’s brief, utilizing the same linguistic framework as 
the SG’s brief to interpret the Court’s precedent: 
This rule has been characterized 
as attaching “particular 
significance to an acquittal” 
(United States v. Scott, supra, 437 
U.S. at 91), and it has been 
justified on the basis that “[t]o 
permit a second trial after an 
acquittal, however mistaken the 
acquittal may have been, would 
present an unacceptably high risk 
that the Government, with its 
vastly superior resources, might 
wear down the defendant so that 
‘even though innocent he may be 
found guilty.’” Ibid.109
This is justified on the ground 
that, however mistaken the 
acquittal may have been, there 
would be an unacceptably high 
risk that the Government, with its 
superior resources, would wear 
down a defendant, thereby 
“enhancing the possibility that 
even though innocent he may be 
found guilty.” Green v. United 
States, 355 U.S., at 188.110
The decisions of this Court in the 
sentencing area have also 
established that a sentence does 
not have qualities of 
constitutional finality comparable 
to an acquittal.111
This Court’s decisions in the 
sentencing area clearly establish 
that a sentence does not have the 
qualities of constitutional finality 
that attend an acquittal.112
The multiple punishment 
guarantee that has evolved in the 
holdings of this Court, apart from 
the Benz dictum, clearly is not 
involved in this case. . . . As in Ex
The guarantee against multiple 
punishment that has evolved in 
the holdings of this Court plainly 
is not involved in this case. As Ex
parte Lange demonstrates, a 
 108. 449 U.S. 117 (1980). 
 109. Brief for the United States at *21, DiFrancesco v. United States, 1980 WL 339988 
(U.S. May 28, 1980) (No. 79-567) [hereinafter DiFrancesco Brief]. 
110. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 130. 
 111. DiFrancesco Brief, supra note 109, at *28 (discussing Bozza v. United States, 330 
U.S. 160 (1947)).






      11/10/2016   09:41:10
38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 32 Side B      11/10/2016   09:41:10
FELDMANRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2016 12:38 PM
56 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
parte Lange, a defendant may not 
receive a higher sentence than 
that authorized by the 
legislature. . . . Clearly, no double 
jeopardy problem would have 
been presented in Ex parte Lange
if Congress had established that 
the offense was punishable by 
fine and imprisonment, even 
though those are multiple 
punishments. See Whalen v. 
United States, supra, slip op. 4. 
There is no question what 
punishment was authorized by 
Congress under 18 U.S.C. 3575 
and 18 U.S.C. 3576 . . . . 
Accordingly, 18 U.S.C. 3576 
does not violate the guarantee 
against multiple punishment that 
is enunciated in Ex parte 
Lange.113
defendant may not receive a 
greater sentence than the 
legislature has authorized. No 
double jeopardy problem would 
have been presented in Ex parte 
Lange if Congress had provided 
that the offense there was 
punishable by both fine and 
imprisonment, even though that is 
multiple punishment. See Whalen
v. United States, 445 U.S., at 
688–689; . . . id., at 697–698 
(concurring opinion). The 
punishment authorized by 
Congress under §§ 3575 and 
3576 is clear and specific and, 
accordingly, does not violate the 
guarantee against multiple 
punishment expounded by Ex
parte Lange.114
DiFrancesco also tracks the reasoning and language in the 
SG’s brief to explain the Court’s decision that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause is not violated by allowing the government to 
appeal:
Since it is not a prosecution 
appeal itself that can fall afoul of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause, but 
rather the relief requested by the 
appeal, it must next be considered 
whether a criminal sentence, once 
pronounced, must be accorded 
constitutional finality similar to 
that attaching to a jury’s verdict 
of not guilty. Neither the history 
The double jeopardy focus, thus, 
is not on the appeal but on the 
relief that is requested, and our 
task is to determine whether a 
criminal sentence, once 
pronounced, is to be accorded 
constitutional finality and 
conclusiveness similar to that 
which attaches to a jury’s verdict 
of acquittal. We conclude that 
 113. DiFrancesco Brief, supra note 109, at *46–*47 (emphasis in original). 
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of sentencing practices, the 
pertinent holdings of this Court, 
nor considerations of double 
jeopardy policy supports such an 
equation.115
neither the history of sentencing 
practices, nor the pertinent 
rulings of this Court, nor even 
considerations of double jeopardy 
policy support such an 
equation.116
Thus, appeal of a sentence would 
seem to be a violation of double 
jeopardy only if the original 
pronouncement of sentence is to 
be treated in the same way as an 
acquittal and the appeal is to be 
treated as a retrial. . . . 
Essentially, the court of appeals’ 
theory is that the imposition of a 
sentence should be treated, for 
double jeopardy finality purposes, 
as an “implied acquittal” of a 
greater sentence. See Van 
Alstyne, In Gideon’s Wake: 
Harsher Penalties and the 
“Successful” Criminal Appellant,
74 Yale L. J. 606, 634-635 
(1965).117
Appeal of a sentence, therefore, 
would seem to be a violation of 
double jeopardy only if the 
original sentence, as pronounced, 
is to be treated in the same way as 
an acquittal is treated and the 
appeal is to be treated in the same 
way as a retrial. Put another way, 
the argument would be that, for 
double jeopardy finality purposes, 
the imposition of the sentence is 
an “implied acquittal” of any 
greater sentence. See Van Alstyne,
In Gideon’s Wake: Harsher 
Penalties and the “Successful” 
Criminal Appellant, 74 Yale L. J. 
606, 634-635 (1965).118
In a later section, the opinion language mirrors the certainty 
in the SG’s brief regarding the common law tradition of allow-
ing such an appeal: 
While there is little American 
experience with appellate review 
of sentences, this history 
demonstrates that the common 
law has never ascribed such 
finality to a sentence as would 
Thus it may be said with certainty 
that history demonstrates that the 
common law never ascribed such 
finality to a sentence as would 
prevent a legislative body from 
authorizing its appeal by the 
 115. DiFrancesco Brief, supra note 109, at *20. 
116. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 132. 
 117. DiFrancesco Brief, supra note 109, at *21, *23. 
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prevent a legislature from 
authorizing its appeal by the 
prosecution. Indeed, several 
countries that trace their legal 
systems to the English common 
law permit such appeals. See 
Canada: Can. Rev. Stat. §§ 605 
(1)(b) and 748(b)(ii) (Martin’s
Annual Criminal Code (1979)); 
Australia (New South Wales): 
Criminal Appeal Act of 1912, as 
amended in 1924, 3 Pub. Acts 
N.S.W. § 5D (1959); New 
Zealand: Crimes Act 1961, as 
amended by the Crimes 
Amendment Act of 1966, 1 Repr. 
Stat. N.Z. § 383 (a) (1979).119
prosecution. Indeed, countries 
that trace their legal systems to 
the English common law permit 
such appeals. See Can. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 605(1)(b) and 748(b)(ii) 
(1970), Martin’s Annual Criminal 
Code 523, 636 (E. Greenspan ed. 
1979); New Zealand Crimes Act 
1961, as amended by the Crimes 
Amendment Act of 1966, 1 Repr. 
Stat. N. Z. § 383(2) (1979).120
Like the opinion in Lewis, Justice Blackmun’s opinion for 
the Court in Dickerson v. New Banner Institute121 deals with 
sentencing. As happens often in a Lifted case involving the SG, 
the Dickerson Court actually adopts both the SG’s interpretation 
of Lewis as a precedent and the SG’s explanation of why the 
Court should differentiate its reasoning in this case: 
In Lewis, this Court recognized 
an obvious, “commonsense” 
exception to the statutory 
language for persons whose 
convictions have been reversed or 
vacated on appeal or on collateral 
attack (445 U.S. at 60–61 & n.5), 
but that exception is not 
applicable to persons whose 
convictions have been expunged. 
. . . A conviction that has been 
expunged, however, stands on an 
In Lewis, it is true, we recognized 
an obvious exception to the literal 
language of the statute for one 
whose predicate conviction had 
been vacated or reversed on direct 
appeal. 445 U.S., at 61, n. 5; see 
Note, Prior Convictions and the 
Gun Control Act of 1968, 76 
Colum. L. Rev. 326, 334, n. 42 
(1976). But, in contrast, 
expunction does not alter the 
legality of the previous 
 119. DiFrancesco Brief, supra note 109, at *27.
120. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 134. 
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entirely different footing. 
Expunction does not call into 
question the legality of the 
previous conviction, and it does 
not signify that the defendant was 
innocent of the crime for which 
he was convicted. As explained 
below (pages 30–35, infra),
expunction merely means that the 
responsible jurisdiction has 
decided not to accord the 
conviction certain continuing 
effects.122
conviction and does not signify 
that the defendant was innocent 
of the crime to which he pleaded 
guilty. Expunction in Iowa means 
no more than that the State has 
provided a means for the trial 
court not to accord a conviction 
certain continuing effects under 
state law.123
There seems little doubt that 
firearms disabilities may 
constitutionally be attached to an 
expunged conviction (see Lewis
v. United States, supra, 445 U.S. 
at 65–68), and an exception for 
such convictions, unlike 
convictions reversed or vacated 
due to legal error, is far from 
obvious.124
Clearly, firearms disabilities may 
be attached constitutionally to an 
expunged conviction, see Lewis v. 
United States, 445 U.S., at 65–68 
. . . , and an exception for such a 
conviction, unlike one reversed or 
vacated due to trial error, is far 
from obvious.125
Much of the shared reasoning in Dickerson involves 
parallel interpretations of the statute, so the majority of the 
overlapping language focuses on Congressional intent. The 
following is a sampling of the extensive instances in which the 
Dickerson Court adopts the SG’s interpretation of Congressional 
purpose and also adopts much of the SG brief’s language: 
We have found nothing in the 
legislative history of the Gun 
Control Act or related federal 
Although we have searched 
diligently, we have found nothing 
in the legislative history of Title 
 122. Brief for Petitioner at 8, 13–28, Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., 460 U.S. 103 (U.S. 
June 1982) (No. 81-1180) [hereinafter Dickerson Brief].
123. Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 115.
 124. Dickerson Brief, supra note 122, at 13. 
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firearms laws that even faintly 
suggests that state expunctions 
were intended automatically to 
remove the disabilities imposed 
by 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 
(h)(1), and neither the court 
below nor respondent has cited 
any such proof. This lack of 
evidence is highly significant for 
several reasons. First, the purpose 
of the Gun Control Act will be 
frustrated by the decision of the 
court of appeals. That decision 
would require the Secretary to 
grant dealer and manufacturer 
licenses to organizations directed 
by individuals convicted of 
serious criminal offenses (or to 
such individuals themselves) 
whenever the conviction in 
question has been expunged 
under state law. This would result 
even though state expunctions 
typically do not focus upon the 
question with which the Gun 
Control Act is concerned, i.e.,
whether the convicted person is 
fit to engage in the firearms 
business or to possess, ship, 
transport, or receive firearms.126
IV or related federal firearms 
statutes that suggests, even 
remotely, that a state expunction 
was intended automatically to 
remove the disabilities imposed 
by §§ 922(g)(1) and (h)(1). See, e. 
g., S. Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1968); S. Rep. No. 
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1968); H. R. Rep. No. 1577, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); H. 
R. Conf. Rep. No. 1956, 90th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); H. R. 
Rep. No. 488, 90th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. (1968). This lack of 
evidence is significant for several 
reasons. First, the purpose of the 
statute would be frustrated by a 
ruling that gave effect to state 
expunctions; a state expunction 
typically does not focus upon the 
question with which Title IV is 
concerned, namely, whether the 
convicted person is fit to engage 
in the firearms business or to 
possess a firearm.127
Second, . . . ‘‘‘[i]n the absence of 
a plain indication to the contrary 
it is to be assumed when 
Congress enacts a statute that it 
does not intend to make its 
application dependent on state 
Second, ‘‘‘in the absence of a 
plain indication to the contrary. . . 
it is to be assumed when 
Congress enacts a statute that it 
does not intend to make its 
application dependent on state 
 126. Dickerson Brief, supra note 122, at 25–27 (footnote omitted). 
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law.’” NLRB v. Natural Gas 
Utility District, 402 U.S. 600, 603 
(1971), quoting NLRB v. 
Randolph Electric Membership 
Corp., 343 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 
1965). . . . In Jerome v. United 
States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943) 
the Court explained. . . : “That 
assumption is based on the fact 
that the application of federal 
legislation is nationwide and at 
times on the fact that the federal 
program would be impaired if 
state law were to control” . . . . 
[T]he legislative history reveals 
that Congress believed a uniform 
national program was necessary 
to assist in curbing the illegal use 
of firearms. See S. Rep. No. 
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 28, 
76–77 (1968). . . . Title IV “is a 
carefully constructed package of 
gun control legislation. . . . 
‘Congress knew the significance 
and meaning of the language it 
employed.’” Scarborough v. 
United States, supra, 431 U.S. at 
570. As noted, Congress carefully 
crafted a procedure for removing 
those disabilities in appropriate 
cases (see 18 U.S.C. 925(c)).128
law.’” NLRB v. Natural Gas 
Utility Dist., 402 U.S. 600, 603 
(1971), quoting NLRB v. 
Randolph Electric Membership 
Corp., 343 F.2d 60, 62–63 (CA4 
1965). This is because the 
application of federal legislation 
is nationwide and at times the 
federal program would be 
impaired if state law were to 
control. Jerome v. United States,
318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943). . . . 
The legislative history reveals 
that Congress believed a uniform 
national program was necessary 
to assist in curbing the illegal use 
of firearms. See S. Rep. No. 
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 28, 
76–77 (1968). Third, Title IV “is 
a carefully constructed package 
of gun control legislation. . . 
‘Congress knew the significance 
and meaning of the language it 
employed.’” Scarborough v. 
United States, 431 U.S., at 570, 
quoting Barrett v. United States,
423 U.S., at 217. And Congress 
carefully crafted a procedure for 
removing those disabilities in 
appropriate cases. § 925(c).129
As noted above, the Gun Control 
Act “is a carefully constructed 
package of gun control 
legislation,” (Scarborough v. 
United States, supra, 431 U.S. at 
Congress, in framing it, took 
pains to avoid the very problems 
that the Court of Appeals’ 
decision inevitably would create, 
such as individualized federal 
 128. Dickerson Brief, supra note 122, at 27 (brackets in original). 





      11/10/2016   09:41:10
38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 35 Side B      11/10/2016   09:41:10
FELDMANRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2016 12:38 PM
62 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
570) and in framing its terms 
Congress took pains to avoid the 
very sort of problems that the 
decision below will inevitably 
create. The provisions of the Act 
demonstrate that Congress 
endeavored to prevent any 
uncertainty concerning those 
persons subject to disabilities by 
virtue of prior convictions. 
Congress used unambiguous 
language in attaching gun control 
disabilities to “any person . . . 
who has been convicted” of a 
qualifying offense (18 U.S.C. 
922(g)(1) and (h)(1)).130
treatment of every expunction 
law. Congress used unambiguous 
language in attaching gun control 
disabilities to any person “who 
has been convicted” of a 
qualifying offense.131
The Court also tracks the SG’s reasoning almost identically 
in its discussion of similar state statutes: 
More than half the states have 
enacted one or more laws that 
may be broadly classified as 
expunction statutes. . . . The 
various statutes differ, however, 
in almost every particular. While 
some are applicable only to 
young offenders, others may be 
invoked by adults. Some are 
available only to persons 
convicted of certain offenses, but 
others permit the expunction of a 
conviction for any crime, 
including murder. Some are 
confined to first offenders, but 
others permit relief to recidivists. 
Some apply only to persons given 
Over half the States have enacted 
one or more statutes that may be 
classified as expunction 
provisions. . . . These statutes 
differ, however, in almost every 
particular. Some are applicable 
only to young offenders, e. g.,
Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 780.621 
and .622 (1982). Some are 
available only to persons 
convicted of certain offenses, e. 
g., N. J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:52-2(b) 
(West 1982); others, however, 
permit expunction of a conviction 
for any crime including murder, 
e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 
276, § 100A (West Supp. 1982–
 130. Dickerson Brief, supra note 122, at 41. 
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certain sentences or sentenced 
under certain laws, while others 
contain no such restriction. Some 
but not all require a waiting 
period following conviction. 
Some are discretionary, while 
others provide for automatic 
expunction under certain 
circumstances.132
1983). Some are confined to first 
offenders, e. g., Okla. Stat., Tit. 
22, § 991c (Supp. 1982). Some 
are discretionary, e. g., Minn. 
Stat. § 638.02(2) (Supp. 1982), 
while others provide for 
automatic expunction under 
certain circumstances, e. g., Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-912 
(1978).133
The statutes also vary widely in 
the language employed to 
describe what they are supposed 
to do. Various statutes are said to 
“expunge” the conviction, guilty 
verdict, or guilty plea; “seal” the 
file or record; “limit access” to 
the convicted person’s “criminal 
history.”. . . [O]nly a minority . . . 
address . . . whether the expunged 
conviction may be considered in 
sentencing for a subsequent 
offense, in setting bail on 
subsequent charges, or . . . 
whether the expunged conviction 
may be used to impeach 
testimony . . .  and whether . . . 
the convicted person may deny 
the fact of conviction.134
The statutes vary in the language 
employed to describe what they 
do. Some speak of expunging the 
conviction, others of “sealing” 
the file or of causing the 
dismissal of the charge. The 
statutes also differ in their actual 
effect. Some are absolute; others 
are limited. Only a minority 
address questions such as whether 
the expunged conviction may be 
considered in sentencing for a 
subsequent offense or in setting 
bail on a later charge, or whether 
the expunged conviction may be 
used for impeachment purposes, 
or whether the convict may deny 
the fact of his conviction.135
By sharing the SG’s reasoning in Dickerson, the Court 
buttresses its decision from multiple angles. Its doing so 
combined with the high level of language overlap between the 
opinion and the SG’s brief suggests that the respondent’s 
 132. Dickerson Brief, supra note 122, at 31–33 (footnotes omitted). 
133. Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 121.
 134. Dickerson Brief, supra note 122, at 34, 35 (footnotes omitted). 
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arguments had very little influence on the Court’s opinion 
language in Dickerson.
This pattern continues in Russello v. United States,136
another federal-crime-bill case with a Blackmun opinion for the 
Court that frames the facts as laid out by the SG—and, 
consequently, in a way unfavorable to the defendant. The Court, 
for example, adopts the SG’s strong language to define the 
ambiguous term “interest,” which is consequential in the case: 
[T]he term “interest” . . . 
undoubtedly comprehends all 
forms of real and personal 
property, including profits and 
proceeds. This Court has 
repeatedly relied upon the term 
“interest” in defining the meaning 
of “property” in the Due Process 
Clause. . . . Perry v. Sinderman,
408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).137
[T]he term“interest”comprehends 
all forms of real and personal 
property, including profits and 
proceeds. This Court repeatedly 
has relied upon the term “interest” 
in defining the meaning of 
“property” in the Due Process 
Clause. . . . See Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 
. . .  (1972).138
It was undoubtedly because 
Congress did not want the RICO 
forfeiture provision to be limited 
by “rigid, technical” (Perry v.
Sindermann, supra, 408 U.S. at 
601) definitions drawn from other 
areas of law that it selected the 
broad term “interest” to describe 
those things subject to forfeiture 
under Section 1963(a)(1). 
Congress therefore selected the 
term “interest.” . . .   This choice 
of language was fully consistent 
with the pattern of the RICO 
statute.139
It undoubtedly was because 
Congress did not wish the 
forfeiture provision of § 1963(a) 
to be limited by rigid and 
technical definitions drawn from 
other areas of the law that it 
selected the broad term “interest” 
to describe those things that are 
subject to forfeiture under the 
statute. Congress selected this 
general term apparently because 
it was fully consistent with the 
pattern of the RICO statute in 
utilizing terms and concepts of 
breadth. . . . 140
 136. 464 U.S. 16 (1983). 
 137. Brief for the United States at 14, Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (May 1983) 
(No. 82-472) [hereinafter Russello Brief]. 
138. Russello, 464 U.S. at 21.
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If Congress had intended to 
restrict subsection (a)(1) to 
interests in an enterprise, as 
petitioner argues, it presumably 
would have done so expressly, as 
it did in subsection (a)(2).141
Had Congress intended to restrict 
§ 1963(a)(1) to an interest in an 
enterprise, it presumably would 
have done so expressly as it did 
in the immediately following 
subsection (a)(2).142
As is the case with many Lifted opinions, the Russello
Court uses reasoning similar to that of the SG’s brief for 
rejecting the opposing party’s contentions. But this feature 
pervades the Russello opinion to a much greater extent than in 
some Lifted opinions, as is evident in the following passages: 
[P]etitioner has not attempted to 
define the term “interest.” 
Petitioner insists . . ., however, 
that the term does not reach 
profits and proceeds because 
‘‘‘[i]nterest’, by definition, 
includes of necessity an interest 
in something.” . . . This argument 
is plainly invalid. Every property 
interest, including the ownership 
of or right to receive profits or 
proceeds, may be described as an 
interest in something. Before the 
profits of an illegal enterprise are 
divided, each participant may be 
said to own an “interest” in the 
ill-gotten gain. After distribution, 
each participant will have a 
possessory or ownership interest 
in currency, valuables, a bank 
account, stocks, bonds, or the 
like.143
Petitioner himself has not 
attempted to define the term 
“interest” as used in § 1963(a)(1). 
He insists, however, that the term 
does not reach money or profits 
because, he says: “‘interest,’ by 
definition, includes of necessity 
an interest in something.” Brief 
for Petitioner 9. . . . We do not 
agree. Every property interest, 
including a right to profits or 
proceeds, may be described as an 
interest in something. Before 
profits of an illegal enterprise are 
divided, each participant may be 
said to own an “interest” in the 
ill-gotten gains. After distribution, 
each will have a possessory 
interest in currency or other items 
so distributed.144
140. Russello, 464 U.S. at 21–22.
 141. Russello Brief, supra note 137, at 21. 
142. Russello, 464 U.S. at 23.
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Petitioner argues (Br. 17–18) that 
if the term ‘‘‘interest’ were as all 
encompassing as suggested by the 
en banc decision below, 18 
U.S.C. Sec. 1963(a)(2) would 
have no meaning independent of 
18 U.S.C. Sec. 1963(a)(1).” This 
argument is plainly incorrect. 
Section 1963(a)(1) reaches “any 
interest,” whether or not in an 
enterprise, provided that the 
interest was “acquired or 
maintained in violation of section 
1962.” Section 1963(a)(2), on the 
other hand, is restricted to 
interests in an enterprise, but the 
interest itself need not have been 
illegally acquired or 
maintained.145
It is no answer to say, as 
petitioner does, Brief for 
Petitioner 17-18, that if the term 
“interest” were as all-
encompassing as suggested by the 
majority opinion of the Court of 
Appeals, § 1963(a)(2) would have 
no meaning independent of § 
1963(a)(1), and would be mere 
surplusage. This argument is 
plainly incorrect. Subsection 
(a)(1) reaches “any interest,” 
whether or not in an enterprise, 
provided it was “acquired . . . in 
violation of section 1962.” 
Subsection (a)(2), on the other 
hand, is restricted to an interest in 
an enterprise, but that interest 
itself need not have been illegally 
acquired.146
Petitioner also suggests (Br. 29–
33) that subsequent proposed 
legislation demonstrates that the 
1970 RICO forfeiture statute 
excludes profits. This conclusion 
is wholly unjustified. The bills in 
question were introduced to 
rectify Marubeni and similar 
district court cases. Their 
introduction hardly suggests that 
their sponsors viewed those 
decisions as correct interpretations
of 18 U.S.C. 1963(a)(1) as it 
currently stands. See United 
States v. Gordon, 638 F.2d 886, 
The bills to which petitioner 
refers, however, were introduced 
in order to overcome the 
decisions in Marubeni, Meyers,
and Thevis. See, e. g., S. 2320, 
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). The 
introduction of these bills hardly 
suggests that their sponsors 
viewed those decisions as correct 
interpretations of § 1963(a)(1). 
See United States v. Gordon, 638 
F.2d 886, 888, n. 5 (CA5), cert. 
denied, 452 U.S. 909 (1981). In 
any event, it is well settled that 
‘‘‘the views of a subsequent 
144. Russello, 464 U.S. at 22.
 145. Russello Brief, supra note 137, at 22–23. 
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888 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981). And, in 
any event, it is settled that ‘‘‘the 
views of a subsequent Congress 
form a hazardous basis for 
inferring the intent of an earlier 
one.’” Jefferson County 
Pharmaceutical Association v. 
Abbott Laboratories, No. 81-827 
(Feb. 23, 1983), slip op. 15 n.27, 
quoting United States v. Price,
361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960). See 
also United States v. Clark, 445 
U.S. 23, 33 n.9 (1980).147
Congress form a hazardous basis 
for inferring the intent of an 
earlier one.’” Jefferson County 
Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Abbott 
Laboratories, 460 U.S. 150, 165, 
n. 27 (1983), quoting from United
States v. Price, [361 U.S. 304, 
313] . . .  (1960). See, also, 
United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 
23, 33, n. 9 . . . (1980).148
For the same reasons, petitioner’s 
argument draws no support from 
the fact that certain state 
racketeering laws provide 
expressly for the forfeiture of 
“profits,” “money,” or “all 
property, real or personal,” 
acquired from racketeering (see 
Pet. Br. 8–9). With one 
exception, all of the state 
provisions upon which petitioner 
relies postdate federal court 
decisions barring the forfeiture of 
racketeering profits under the 
federal law. See United States v. 
Meyers, 432 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. 
Pa. 1977); United States v. 
Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. 
Ga. 1979). Undoubtedly aware of 
the problems created by such 
decisions, the legislatures of these 
states presumably employed 
language different from that in 18 
Neither are we persuaded by 
petitioner’s argument that his 
position is supported by the fact 
that certain state racketeering 
statutes expressly provide for the 
forfeiture of “profits,” “money,” 
“interest or property,” or “all 
property, real or personal,” 
acquired from racketeering. Brief 
for Petitioner 8-9. Nearly all of 
the state statutes postdate the 
Meyers and Thevis district court 
decisions. See, e. g., Colo. Rev. 
Stat. Sec. 18-17-106 (Supp. 1982) 
(enacted in 1981); R.I. Gen. Laws 
§ 7-15-3 (Supp. 1982) (enacted in 
1981). The legislatures of those 
States presumably employed 
language different from that of 
Sec. 1963(a)(1) so as to avoid 
narrow interpretations of their 
laws along the lines of the narrow 
interpretations given the federal 
 147. Russello Brief, supra note 137, at 31–32 (footnote omitted). 
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U.S.C. 1963(a)(1) in order to 
avoid similar interpretations of 
their new racketeering laws.149
statute by the courts in Meyers 
and Thevis.150
As evidence that Congress did 
not intend to reach racketeering 
profits, petitioner points (Br. 14–
15) to a 1969 letter from then 
Deputy Attorney General 
Kleindienst to Senator McClellan 
. . . . concerning an earlier version 
of Section 1963(a)(1) (Senate
Hearings, supra , at 407). . . . The 
court below correctly concluded 
that this letter did not indicate a 
congressional intent to preclude
forfeiture of racketeering profits. 
The sentence at issue did not refer 
to Section 1963(a) as finally 
enacted but to an earlier version 
in which forfeiture was expressly 
limited to interests in an 
enterprise. Thus, by stating that 
forfeiture under Section 1963(a) 
was “limited . . . to one’s interest 
in the enterprise,” the letter was 
merely following the language of 
the bill then pending. Moreover, 
the purpose of this sentence was 
not to explain what the statutory 
provision meant but to explain 
why the Department of Justice 
believed it was constitutional.151
We are not persuaded otherwise 
by the presence of a 1969 letter 
from the then Deputy Attorney 
General to Senator McClellan. 
See Measures Relating to 
Organized Crime: Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Laws and Procedures of 
the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 
407 (1969). That letter, with its 
reference to “one’s interest in the 
enterprise” does not indicate, for 
us, any congressional intent to 
preclude forfeiture of 
racketeering profits. The 
reference, indeed, is not to § 
1963(a) as finally enacted but to 
an earlier version in which 
forfeiture was to be expressly 
limited to an interest in an 
enterprise. The letter was merely 
following the language of the 
then pending bill. Furthermore, 
the real purpose of the sentence 
was not to explain what the 
statutory provision meant, but to 
explain why the Department of 
Justice believed it was 
constitutional.152
 149. Russello Brief, supra note 137, at 32–33 (footnote omitted). 
 150. Russello, 464 U.S. at 26.
 151. Russello Brief, supra note 137, at 45–46. 
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Without delving into the psychology of the Justices and 
their clerks, it is impossible to determine if they used 
independent reasoning to reject the petitioner’s points in 
Russello. But the high similarity between the language in the 
opinion and the SG’s brief suggests that, at very least, the Court 
found the SG’s arguments far more compelling than those made 
by the respondent. 
As in Russello, Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the Court in 
United States v. National Bank of Commerce153 almost entirely 
follows the linguistic template set forth in the SG’s brief. The 
examples below show that the Court’s opinion uses language 
about Congressional intent that is highly similar to that in the 
SG’s brief: 
In holding that Roy did not 
possess “property [or] rights to 
property” on which the IRS could 
levy, the court of appeals relied 
heavily on Arkansas creditors’ 
rights law. . . . This reasoning 
seriously misconceives the role 
properly played by state law in 
federal tax collection matters.154
The Court of Appeals’ conclusion 
that Roy did not possess “property 
[or] rights to property” on which 
the IRS could levy rested heavily 
on its understanding of the 
Arkansas law of creditors’ rights, 
particularly those in garnishment.  
. . . As we have suggested, this 
misconceives the role properly 
played by state law in federal tax-
collection matters.155
[T]he facts that under Arkansas 
law Roy’s creditors (unlike Roy 
himself) could not exercise his 
right of withdrawal in their favor 
. . . and would have to join his co-
depositors in a garnishment 
proceeding . . . are irrelevant in 
answering the question presented 
here. The federal statute . . . refers 
Thus, the facts that under 
Arkansas law Roy’s creditors, 
unlike Roy himself, could not 
exercise his right of withdrawal 
in their favor and in a 
garnishment proceeding would 
have to join his codepositors are 
irrelevant. The federal statute 
relates to the taxpayer’s rights to 
 153. 472 U.S. 713 (1985). 
 154. Brief for the United States at *28–*29, United States v. National Bank of 
Commerce, 1985 WL 669719 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1985) (No. 84-498) [hereinafter Nat’l Bank of 
Commerce Brief]. 
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to the taxpayer’s property and 
rights to property, not to his 
creditor’s rights. Yet the court of 
appeals has . . . deprived the . . . 
statute of all independent force, 
by remitting the IRS to only the 
rights that an ordinary creditor . . 
. would have under state law. 
That result . . . is to “compare the 
government to a class of creditors 
to which it is superior” (Randall,
542 F.2d at 274 n.8).156
property and not to his creditors’ 
rights. The Court of Appeals 
would remit the IRS to the rights 
only an ordinary creditor would 
have under state law. That result 
“[compares] the government to a 
class of creditors to which it is 
superior.” Randall v. H. 
Nakashima & Co., 542 F.2d 270, 
274, n.8 (CA5 1976).157
In its solicitude for the potential 
claims of Roy’s co-depositors, 
the court of appeals has ignored 
the statutory scheme that 
Congress established.158
In its understandable concern for 
Ruby’s and Neva’s property 
interests, the Court of Appeals 
has ignored the statutory scheme 
established by Congress to 
protect those rights.159
As a final justification for 
refusing to impose personal 
liability on the bank, the court of 
appeals theorized that an IRS 
levy “is not normally intended for 
use as against property in which 
third parties have an interest” or 
“as against property bearing on 
its face the names of third 
parties.” (Pet. App. 17a). The 
court appeared to recognize that 
Congress’s enactment of Section 
7426—which permits wrongful-
levy actions by “any person who 
claims an interest in” seized 
property—tended to undermine 
The Court of Appeals’ final 
justification for its holding was 
its belief that an IRS levy “is not 
normally intended for use as 
against property in which third 
parties have an interest” or “as 
against property bearing on its 
face the names of third parties, 
and in which those third parties 
likely have a property interest.” 
726 F.2d, at 1300. The court 
acknowledged the existence of 
§ 7426 but felt that that statute 
was designed to protect only 
those third parties “whose 
property has been seized 
 156. Nat’l Bank of Commerce Brief, supra note 154, at *30 (emphasis in original).
157. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 727. 
 158. Nat’l Bank of Commerce Brief, supra note 154, at *33.
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this theory. But the court 
suggested that the Section 7426 
remedy is designed to protect 
only those third parties “whose 
property has been seized 
‘inadvertently’” (Pet. App. 
17a).160
‘inadvertently.’” 726 F.2d, at 
1300.161
While the opinion in National Bank of Commerce utilizes 
the SG brief throughout, relying especially on its legal 
reasoning, the opinion in United States v. Hughes Properties162
utilizes language and reasoning from the SG’s brief to interpret 
and apply the Court’s precedent. Some examples include: 
This Court has consistently held 
that a liability does not accrue for 
purposes of the “all events” test 
as long as it remains contingent. 
Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 
193, 200 (1934). To be deductible 
for tax purposes, “the obligation 
to pay [must] ha[ve] become final 
and definite.” Security Flour 
Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 
U.S. 281, 287 (1944). It must be 
“unconditional.” Lucas v. North 
Texas Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 11, 
13 (1930).163
The Court’s cases have 
emphasized that “a liability does 
not accrue as long as it remains 
contingent.” Brown v. Helvering,
291 U.S. 193, 200 . . . (1934); 
accord, Dixie Pine Products Co. 
v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 516, 
519 . . . (1944). Thus, to satisfy 
the all-events test, a liability must 
be “final and definite in amount,” 
Security Flour Mills Co. v. 
Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281, 287 
. . . (1944), must be “fixed and 
absolute,” Brown v. Helvering,
291 U.S., at 201 . . . , and must be 
“unconditional,” Lucas v. North 
Texas Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 11, 
13 . . . (1930).164
 160. Nat’l Bank of Commerce Brief, supra note 154, at *36–*37.
161. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 729–30. 
 162. 476 U.S. 593 (1986). 
 163. Brief for the United States at 8, United States v. Hughes Properties, 476 U.S. 593 
(Feb. 1986) (No. 85-554) [hereinafter Hughes Properties Brief] (brackets in original).
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Rather, “the tax law requires that 
a deduction be deferred until ‘all 
the events’ have occurred that 
will make it fixed and certain” 
(Thor Power Tool Co., 439 U.S. 
at 543).165
And one may say that “the tax 
law requires that a deduction be 
deferred until ‘all the events’ 
have occurred that will make it 
fixed and certain.” Thor Power 
Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 
U.S. 522, 543 . . . (1979).166
Congress’s decision to grant the 
Commissioner “broad powers” to 
depart from the taxpayer’s usual 
accounting practice in computing 
taxable income owes in part to 
“the vastly different objectives 
that financial and tax accounting 
have.” Thor Power Tool Co., 439 
U.S. at 542. “The primary goal of 
financial accounting is to provide 
useful information to 
management, shareholders, [and] 
creditors” and “to protect these 
parties from being misled” (ibid.).
. . . “[T]he major responsibility of 
the Internal Revenue Service,” by 
contrast, “is to protect the public 
fisc.”167
The Court has long recognized 
“the vastly different objectives 
that financial and tax accounting 
have.” Thor Power Tool Co. v. 
Commissioner, 439 U.S., at 542. . 
. . The goal of financial 
accounting is to provide useful 
and pertinent information to 
management, shareholders, and 
creditors. On the other hand, the 
major responsibility of the 
Internal Revenue Service is to 
protect the public fisc. Ibid.168
In Department of the Navy v. Egan,169 in which Justice 
Blackmun again wrote for the Court, the opinion adopts the 
caselaw and statutory analysis provided in the SG’s brief as the 
basis for its interpretation and application of precedent:
 165. Hughes Properties Brief, supra note 163, at 10. 
166. Hughes Properties, 476 U.S. at 600–01.
 167. Hughes Properties Brief, supra note 163, at 24 (brackets in original). 
168. Hughes Properties, 476 U.S. at 603.
 169. 484 U.S. 518 (1988). 
This Court has . . . recognized the 
government’s “compelling 
interest” in withholding national 
This Court has recognized the 
Government’s “compelling 
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National security matters, as this 
Court has recognized, are “the 
province and responsibility of the 
executive.” Haig v. Agee, 453 
U.S. 280, 293–294, 304 (1981). 
“As to these areas of Art. II duties 
the courts have traditionally 
shown the utmost deference to 
Presidential responsibilities.” 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 
683, 710 (1974). Absent an 
unambiguous grant of jurisdiction 
by Congress, courts have 
traditionally been reluctant to 
intrude upon the authority of the 
executive in military and national 
security affairs. See, e.g., Orloff
v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93–
94 (1953); Burns v. Wilson, 346 
U.S. 137, 142, 144 (1953); 
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 
10 (1973); Schlesinger v. 
Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757-
The Court also has recognized 
“the generally accepted view that 
foreign policy was the province 
and responsibility of the 
Executive.” Haig v. Agee, 453 
U.S. 280, 293–294 . . . (1981). 
“As to these areas of Art. II duties 
the courts have traditionally 
shown the utmost deference to 
Presidential responsibilities.” 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 
683, 710 . . . (1974). Thus, unless 
Congress specifically has 
provided otherwise, courts 
traditionally have been reluctant 
to intrude upon the authority of 
the Executive in military and 
national security affairs. See, e.g.,
Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 
83, 93–94 . . . (1953); Burns v. 
Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142, 144 
. . . (1953); Gilligan v. Morgan,
413 U.S. 1, 10 . . . (1973), 
 170. Brief for Petitioner at *15–*16, Department of the Navy v. Egan, 1987 WL 880362 
(U.S. Aug. 10, 1987) (No. 86-1552) [hereinafter Egan Brief].
171. Egan, 484 U.S. at 527.  
security information from 
unauthorized persons in the 
course of executive business 
(Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 
507, 509 n.3 (1980) . . .). See, 
e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 
U.S. 258, 267 (1967); United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 
(1953). . . . The authority and the 
solemn obligation to protect such 
information fall on the President 
as head of the Executive Branch 
and Commander in Chief.170
security information from 
unauthorized persons in the 
course of executive business. 
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 
507, 509, n. 3 . . . (1980). See 
also United States v. Robel, 389 
U.S. 258, 267 . . . (1967); United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 
. . . The authority to protect such 
information falls on the President 
as head of the Executive Branch 
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758 (1975); Chappell v. Wallace,
462 U.S. 296 (1983). The court of 
appeals’ contrary holding . . . puts 
the matter backwards.172
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 
U.S. 738, 757–758 . . . (1975); 
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 
296 . . .  (1983).We feel that the 
contrary conclusion of the Court 
of Appeals’ majority is not in line 
with this authority.173
The Egan Court’s language also tracks that from the brief 
regarding the policy rationale of the case and its implications: 
No individual has a “right” to a 
security clearance. Under long 
established principles, the grant 
of a security clearance requires an 
affirmative act of discretion on 
the part of the granting official 
based on a high degree of 
confidence in the grantee. . . . The 
general standard therefore is that 
a clearance may be granted only 
when “clearly consistent with the 
interests of the national security.” 
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 10,450, 
Sec. Sec. 2, 7, 3 C.F.R. 936, 938 
(1949–1953 Comp.); OPNAV
INST 5510.1F, para. 16-100(1); 
10 C.F.R. 710.10(a) (Department 
of Energy regulation); 32 C.F.R. 
156.3(a) (Department of Defense 
regulation); Department of 
Defense Regulation 5200.2-R, 
para. 6-100(a) (Dec. 1979).174
It should be obvious that no one 
hasa“right” to a securityclearance. 
The grant of a clearance requires 
an affirmative act of discretion on 
the part of the granting official. 
The general standard is that a 
clearance may be granted only 
when “clearly consistent with the 
interests of the national security.” 
See, e. g., Exec. Order No. 10450, 
Sec. Sec. 2 and 7, 3 CFR 936, 
938 (1949–1953 Comp.); 10 CFR 
Sec.710.10(a)(1987) (Department 
of Energy); 32 CFR Sec. 156.3(a) 
(1987) (Department of 
Defense).175
A clearance determination . . . is 
not a judgment of an individual or 
A clearance does not equate with 
passing judgment upon an 
 172. Egan Brief, supra note 170, at *20–*21.
173. Egan, 484 U.S. at 529–30. 
 174. Egan Brief, supra note 170, at *17–*18.
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his past conduct. It is an attempt 
to predict his future behavior, to 
assess whether he might . . . 
under the compulsion of 
circumstances beyond his control, 
compromise sensitive information.
The prediction may be based upon 
the individual’s past or present 
conduct; but it may also be based 
upon concerns unrelated to an 
individual’s conduct, such as 
whether he has close relatives 
residing in a country that is 
hostile to the United States.176
individual’s character. Instead, it 
is only an attempt to predict his 
possible future behavior and to 
assess whether, under compulsion 
of circumstances or for other 
reasons, he might compromise 
sensitive information. It may be 
based, to be sure, upon past or 
present conduct, but it also may 
be based upon concerns 
completely unrelated to conduct, 
such as having close relatives 
residing in a country hostile to the 
United States.177
Such predictive judgments must 
be made by those with the 
necessary expertise in protecting 
classified information. For 
“reasons . . . too obvious to call 
for enlarged discussion” (CIA v. 
Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 170 (1985)), 
the protection of classified 
information must be committed to 
the broad discretion of the 
agencies responsible . . . , and this 
must include broad discretion to 
judge who may have access to it. 
It is not reasonably possible for 
an outside, nonexpert body to 
review the substance of such a 
judgment and decide whether, 
under the “clearly consistent” 
standard, the agency should have 
been able to make the necessary 
affirmative prediction with the 
necessary confidence.178
Predictive judgment of this kind 
must be made by those with the 
necessary expertise in protecting 
classified information. For 
“reasons. . . too obvious to call 
for enlarged discussion,” CIA v. 
Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 170 . . . 
(1985), the protection of 
classified information must be 
committed to the broad discretion 
of the agency responsible, and 
this must include broad discretion 
to determine who may have 
access to it. Certainly, it is not 
reasonably possible for an outside 
nonexpert body to review the 
substance of such a judgment and 
to decide whether the agency 
should have been able to make 
the necessary affirmative 
prediction with confidence.179
 176. Egan Brief, supra note 170, at *18.
177. Egan, 484 U.S. at 528–29. 
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Nor can such a body determine 
what constitutes an acceptable 
margin of error in assessing the 
potential risk that confidential 
information will be compromised. 
Accordingly, this Court has 
acknowledged that with respect to 
employees in sensitive positions 
“there is a reasonable basis for 
the view that an agency head who 
must bear the responsibility for 
the protection of classified 
information committed to his 
custody should have the final say 
in deciding whether to repose his 
trust in an employee who has 
access to such information.” Cole
v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 546 
(1956).180
Nor can such a body determine 
what constitutes an acceptable 
margin of error in assessing the 
potential risk. The Court 
accordingly has acknowledged 
that with respect to employees in 
sensitive positions “there is a 
reasonable basis for the view that 
an agency head who must bear 
the responsibility for the 
protection of classified 
information committed to his 
custody should have the final say 
in deciding whether to repose his 
trust in an employee who has 
access to such information.” Cole
v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 546 . . . 
(1956).181
In John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp.,182 the Court 
examined an exemption under the federal Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA). Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the 
Court relies on the SG’s brief primarily for the interpretation of 
the relevant statutory provisions: 
The Legislative History Of 
Exemption 7, As Enacted And As 
Amended In 1974, Confirms The 
Plain Meaning Of Exemption 7. 
. . . This Court thoroughly 
discussed the legislative history 
of Exemption 7 in NLRB v. 
Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 
U.S. 214, 224–236 (1978). As 
originally enacted, Exemption 7 
If, despite what we regard as the 
plain meaning of the statutory 
language, it were necessary or 
advisable to examine the 
legislative history of Exemption 
7, as originally enacted and as 
amended in 1974, we would 
reach the same conclusion. 
Justice Marshall, writing for the 
Court in Robbins Tire, 437 U.S., 
179. Egan, 484 U.S. at 529. 
 180. Egan Brief, supra note 170, at *20 (emphasis in original).
181. Egan, 484 U.S. at 529. 
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permitted nondisclosure of 
“investigatory files compiled for 
law enforcement purposes except 
to the extent available by law to a 
private party.” 80 Stat. 251. By 
that exemption, “Congress 
recognized that law enforcement 
agencies had legitimate needs to 
keep certain records confidential, 
lest the agencies be hindered in 
their investigations or placed at a 
disadvantage when it came time 
to present their cases.” Robbins 
Tire, 437 U.S. at 224.183
at 224–236, . . . discussed this 
legislative history in detail. In its 
original 1966 form, Exemption 7 
permitted nondisclosure of 
“investigatory files compiled for 
law enforcement purposes except 
to the extent available by law to a 
private party.” Pub. L. 89-487, 
§3(e)(7), 80 Stat. 251. But the 
Court in Robbins Tire observed: 
“Congress recognized that law 
enforcement agencies had 
legitimate needs to keep certain 
records confidential, lest the 
agencies be hindered in their 
investigations or placed at a 
disadvantage when it came time 
to present their cases.” 437 U.S., 
at 224.184
The legislative history of the 
1974 amendments says nothing 
about limiting Exemption 7 to 
those documents originating as 
law enforcement records.185
The legislative history of the 
1974 amendments says nothing 
about limiting Exemption 7 to 
those documents originating as 
law-enforcement records.186
This Court has consistently taken 
a practical approach to 
interpreting FOIA in an effort to 
apply a workable statutory 
balance between the interests of 
the public in greater access to 
information and the needs of the 
government in protecting certain 
This Court consistently has taken 
a practical approach when it has 
been confronted with an issue of 
interpretation of the Act. It has 
endeavored to apply a workable 
balance between the interests of 
the public in greater access to 
information and the needs of the 
 183. Brief for Petitioner at *24, John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 1988 WL 1025573 
(U.S. n.d.) (No. 88-1083) (beginning quoted matter with a section heading) [hereinafter 
Doe Agency Brief].
184. Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 155–56. 
 185. Doe Agency Brief, supra note 183, at *28 (emphasis in original).
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kinds of information from 
disclosure. See, e.g., EPA v. 
Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973); 
Department of the Air Force v. 
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361–362 
(1976); Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 
U.S. 345, 352 (1982). In accord 
with that approach, the Court looks
to the reasons for exemption from 
FOIA’s mandatory disclosure 
requirements in determining 
whether the government has 
properly invoked a particular 
exemption. See, e.g., NLRB v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 
132, 148–154 (1975); FBI v. 
Abramson, 456 U.S. at 630. In 
applying Exemption 7, this Court 
has looked carefully at the effect 
that disclosure would have on the 
interests that exemption seeks to 
protect. In NLRB v. Robbins Tire 
& Rubber Co., 437 U.S. at 242–
243. . . . 187
Government to protect certain 
kinds of information from 
disclosure. The Court looks to the 
reasons for exemption from the 
disclosure requirements in 
determining whether the 
Government has properly 
invoked a particular exemption. 
See e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck 
& Co., 421 U.S. 132, 148–154 
. . . (1975). In applying Exemption 
7, the Court carefully has 
examined the effect that 
disclosure would have on the 
interest the exemption seeks to 
protect. Robbins Tire, 437 U.S., 
at 242–243. . . .188
The Doe Agency opinion also relies on the SG’s 
interpretation of the lower court opinion and the SG’s 
interpretation of the opposing parties’ arguments: 
The plain meaning of the word 
“compile” does not permit such a 
distinction [as made by the Court 
of Appeals]. It is the pulling 
together of materials that 
constitutes the compiling. It does 
not matter whence the documents 
were obtained. . . . This Court 
We disagree with that 
interpretation for, in our view, the 
plain meaning of the word 
“compile,” or, for that matter, of 
its adjectival form “compiled,” 
does not permit such refinement. 
This Court itself has used the 
word “compile” naturally to refer 
 187. Doe Agency Brief, supra note 183, at *33.
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itself has used the word 
“compiled,” quite naturally, to 
refer to the process of pulling 
together at one time records and 
information that were generated 
(or even compiled) at an earlier 
time and for different purposes. 
In FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. at 
622 n.5. . . . 189
even to the process of gathering 
at one time records and 
information that were generated 
on an earlier occasion and for a 
different purpose. See FBI v. 
Abramson, 456 U.S., at 622, n. 5. 
. . .190
Even respondent has used the 
noun form of the word 
“compiled” in its ordinary sense 
to refer to the gathering together 
of documents, whether or not 
they were generated or compiled 
at an earlier time for a different 
purpose. In its FOIA requests of 
September 30, 1986, and 
February 3, 1987, respondent 
“ask[ed] that copies of the 
requested materials be furnished 
to us as soon as individual items 
are available, and that your 
response to this request not await 
a compilation of all the materials 
requested.” J.A. 21, 47–48. Thus 
respondent, unlike the court of 
appeals, obviously and quite 
properly recognized that the 
documents’ having been 
“compiled” once for the purpose 
of routine audits would in no way 
prevent their being compiled 
again later for a different 
purpose.191
Respondent, too, has used the 
word “compile” in its ordinary 
sense to refer to the assembling of 
documents, even though those 
documents were put together at 
an earlier time for a different 
purpose. In its FOIA requests of 
September 30, 1986, and 
February 3, 1987, respondent 
asked that the requested materials 
be furnished as soon as they were 
available, and that the response to 
the request “not await a 
compilation of all the materials 
requested.” App. 21, 47-48. This 
was a recognition, twice repeated, 
that the documents having been 
compiled once for the purpose of 
routine audits were not 
disqualified from being 
“compiled” again later for a 
different purpose.192
 189. Doe Agency Brief, supra note 183, at *19.
190. Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 154. 
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[T]he ruling . . . is at odds with 
the plain meaning of the 
exemption.The . . . distinction . . . 
drawn between documents that 
were originally obtained for law 
enforcement purposes and those 
. . . not so originally obtained, but 
later gathered . . . for law 
enforcement purposes, finds no 
support in the plain language.193
We thus do not accept the 
distinction the Court of Appeals 
drew between documents that 
originally were assembled for law 
enforcement purposes and those 
that were not so originally 
assembled but were gathered later 
for such purposes. The plain 
language of Exemption 7 does 
not permit such a distinction.194
By adopting the SG’s positions regarding both the lower 
court decision and the opposing parties’ contentions, the Doe 
Agency Court aligns itself with the government’s perspective. 
Reading linearly through an opinion with this extent of shared 
reasoning leaves little room for one to speculate on the Court’s 
conclusions: The Court’s ultimate decision seems a foregone 
conclusion.
In the constitutional case of University of Pennsylvania v. 
EEOC,195 the Court’s opinion parallels the SG’s analysis of Title 
VII provisions and the SG’s explanation for why the petitioner 
interpreted these provisions incorrectly: 
The effect of the elimination of 
Title VII’s exemption for 
educational institutions was to 
expose tenure determinations to 
the same enforcement procedures 
applicable to other employment 
decisions. As this Court has 
noted, Title VII creates ‘‘‘an 
integrated, multistep enforcement 
procedure’ that enables the 
Commission to detect and remedy 
instances of discrimination.” 
EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 
The effect of the elimination of 
this exemption was to expose 
tenure determinations to the  
same enforcement procedures 
applicable to other employment 
decisions. This Court previously 
has observed that Title VII “sets 
forth ‘an integrated, multistep 
enforcement procedure’ that 
enables the Commission to detect 
and remedy instances of 
discrimination.” EEOC v. Shell 
Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 62 . . . 
192. Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 154–55. 
 193. Doe Agency Brief, supra note 183, at *22. 
194. Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 155. 





      11/10/2016   09:41:10
38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 45 Side A      11/10/2016   09:41:10
FELDMANRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2016 12:38 PM
BORROWED LANGUAGE IN SUPREME COURT OPINIONS 81
54, 62 (1984) (citation omitted). 
The efficacy of each step of that 
procedure depends directly on the 
Commission’s unencumbered 
access to information relevant to 
alleged discrimination. The 
Commission’s enforcement 
responsibilities are triggered by 
the filing of a specific, sworn 
charge of discrimination. The Act 
obligates the Commission to 
investigate charges of 
discrimination to determine 
whether “there is reasonable 
cause to believe that the charge is 
true.” Section 706(b) of Title VII, 
42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b).196
(1984), quoting Occidental Life 
Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 
359 . . . (1977). The 
Commission’s enforcement 
responsibilities are triggered by 
the filing of a specific sworn 
charge of discrimination. The Act 
obligates the Commission to 
investigate a charge of 
discrimination to determine 
whether there is “reasonable 
cause to believe that the charge is 
true.” 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(b) 
(1982 ed.).197
If it finds no reasonable cause, the 
Commission is obligated to 
dismiss the charge. Ibid. If it does 
find reasonable cause, the 
Commission “endeavor[s] to 
eliminate [the] alleged unlawful 
employment practice by informal 
methods of conference, 
conciliation, and persuasion.” 
Ibid. This requirement reflects 
Congress’s wish “that violations 
of the statute could be remedied 
without resort to the courts.”  . . . 
If attempts at voluntary resolution 
fail, the Commission may bring 
an action against the employer.198
If it finds no such reasonable 
cause, the Commission is directed 
to dismiss the charge. If it does 
find reasonable cause, the 
Commission shall “endeavor to 
eliminate [the] alleged unlawful 
employment practice by informal 
methods of conference, 
conciliation, and persuasion.” 
Ibid. If attempts at voluntary 
resolution fail, the Commission 
may bring an action against the 
employer.199
 196. Brief for Respondent at *14, University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 1989 WL 
1126944 (U.S. Aug. 15, 1989) (No. 88-493) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Penn Brief]. 
 197. U. Penn, 493 U.S. at 190.
 198. Penn Brief, supra note 196, at *14–*15. 
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To enable the Commission to 
make informed decisions at each 
stage of the enforcement process, 
Section 709(a) of Title VII, 42 
U.S.C. 2000e-8(a), confers a 
broad right of access to relevant 
evidence: [T]he Commission or 
its designated representative shall 
. . . have access to, for the 
purposes of examination, and the 
right to copy any evidence of any 
person being investigated . . . that 
relates to unlawful employment 
practices covered by [the Act] 
and is relevant to the charge 
under investigation. If employers 
refuse to provide information 
voluntarily, the Act authorizes the 
Commission to issue subpoenas 
and to seek orders enforcing 
them. Section 710 of Title VII, 42 
U.S.C. 2000e-9 (incorporating 29 
U.S.C. 161).200
To enable the Commission to 
make informed decisions at each 
stage of the enforcement process, 
§ 2000e-8(a) confers a broad right 
of access to relevant evidence: 
“[T]he Commission or its 
designated representative shall at 
all reasonable times have access 
to, for the purposes of 
examination, and the right to 
copy any evidence of any person 
being investigated . . . that relates 
to unlawful employment practices 
covered by [the Act] and is 
relevant to the charge under 
investigation.” If an employer 
refuses to provide this 
information voluntarily, the Act 
authorizes the Commission to 
issue a subpoena and to seek an 
order enforcing it. §2000e-9 
(incorporating 29 U.S.C. 
§161).201
Petitioner argues, nevertheless, 
that Title VII leaves courts with 
discretion to provide additional 
protection for tenure review 
documents. Although petitioner 
recognizes that Title VII gives the 
Commission broad “power to 
seek access to all evidence that 
may be ‘relevant to the charge 
under investigation’” (Pet. Br. 
38), it nevertheless contends that 
Title VII’s subpoena enforcement 
provisions do not give the 
Petitioner argues, nevertheless, 
that Title VII affirmatively grants 
courts the discretion to require 
more than relevance in order to 
protect tenure-review documents. 
Although petitioner recognizes 
that Title VII gives the 
Commission broad “power to 
seek access to all evidence that 
may be ‘relevant to the charge 
under investigation,’” Brief for 
Petitioner 38 (emphasis added), it 
contends that Title VII’s 
 200. Penn Brief, supra note 196, at *15. 
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Commission an unqualified right 
to acquire such evidence. See 
Pet. Br. 38–41. That 
interpretation is untenable. First, 
the plain language of Section 
709(a) of Title VII, 42 
U.S.C.2000e-8(a), states that the 
Commission “shall . . . have 
access” to relevant evidence; this 
can only be read as giving the 
Commission a right to that 
evidence, not a mere “power to 
seek” it.202
subpoena enforcement provisions 
do not give the Commission an 
unqualified right to acquire such 
evidence. Id., at 38–41. This 
interpretation simply cannot be 
reconciled with the plain 
language of the text of § 2000e-
8(a), which states that the 
Commission “shall . . . have 
access” to “relevant” evidence 
(emphasis added). The provision 
can be read only as giving the 
Commission a right to obtain that 
evidence, not a mere license to 
seek it.203
Title VII anticipates and 
addresses situations in which an 
employer may have an interest in 
the confidentiality of its records. 
The same Section that gives the 
Commission access to any 
evidence relevant to its 
investigations also makes it 
“unlawful for any officer or 
employee of the Commission to 
make public in any manner 
whatever any information 
obtained by the Commission 
pursuant to its authority under 
this section prior to the institution 
of any proceeding” under the Act. 
. . . . Any violation of this 
provision subjects the 
Commission’s employees to 
criminal penalties. Ibid.204
Congress did address situations in 
which an employer may have an 
interest in the confidentiality of 
its records. The same § 2000e-8 
which gives the Commission 
access to any evidence relevant to 
its investigation also makes it 
“unlawful for any officer or 
employee of the Commission to 
make public in any manner 
whatever any information 
obtained by the Commission 
pursuant to its authority under 
this section prior to the institution 
of any proceeding” under the Act. 
A violation of this provision 
subjects the employee to criminal 
penalties. Ibid.205
 202. Penn Brief, supra note 196, at *22 (emphasis in original). 
203. U. Penn., 493 U.S. at 192 (emphasis in original).
 204. Penn Brief, supra note 196, at *21. 
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This deference to the SG’s interpretation of the statutory 
scheme is also evident in C.I.R. v. Keystone Consolidated 
Industries, Inc.206 The Keystone opinion uses some of the SG’s 
language, and some similar to it, in interpreting the tax code, and 
uses the same canons of interpretation. A few examples include: 
But even if “sale or exchange” 
had not had a settled meaning 
under the . . . Code, it would be 
clear that Section 4975(c)(1)(A) 
prohibits the transfer of property 
in satisfaction of a debt. Congress 
did not merely prohibit a “sale or 
exchange,” it barred “any direct 
or indirect . . . . sale or exchange” 
between employers and the 
pension plans they sponsor. At 
the least, the contribution of 
property in satisfaction of a 
funding obligation is a type of 
sale of the property. It is equally 
surely a form of exchange, since 
the property is exchanged for 
diminution of the employer’s 
funding obligation.207
Even if this phrase had not 
possessed a settled meaning, it 
still would be clear that  
§ 4975(c)(1)(A) prohibits the 
transfer of property in satisfaction 
of a debt. Congress barred not 
merely a “sale or exchange.” It 
prohibited something more, 
namely, “any direct or indirect 
. . . sale or exchange.” The 
contribution of property in 
satisfaction of a funding 
obligation is at least both an 
indirect type of sale and a form of 
exchange, since the property is 
exchanged for diminution of the 
employer’s funding obligation.208
Congress’s goal . . . was to bar 
categorically transactions . . . 
likely to injure pension plans. . . . 
The transfer of property to a 
pension plan in satisfaction of a 
funding obligation can jeopardize 
the ability of the plan to pay 
promised benefits.209
Congress’ goal was to bar 
categorically a transaction that 
was likely to injure the pension 
plan. . . . . The transfer of 
encumbered property may 
jeopardize the ability of the plan 
to pay promised benefits.210
 206. 508 U.S. 152 (1993). 
 207. Brief for Petitioner at *17, C.I.R. v. Keystone Consolidated Industries, 1992 WL 
547216 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1992) (No. 91-1677) [hereinafter Keystone Brief]. 
208. Keystone, 508 U.S. at 159. 
 209. Keystone Brief, supra note 207, at *18.
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The statutory text at issue—
providing that a transfer of 
encumbered property “shall be 
treated as” a sale or exchange—
supports the. . .view that Congress 
intended Section 4975(f)(3) to 
expand the scope of the prohibited 
transaction provision. . . . Thus, 
Section 4975(f)(3) amplifies and 
extends the reach of “sale or 
exchange” in Section 4975(c)(1) 
(A) to include contributions of 
encumbered property that do not 
satisfy funding obligations. The 
legislative history confirms that 
Congress understood Section 
4975(f)(3) to enlarge, rather than 
restrict, the reach of the 
prohibited transaction provision . 
. . thus, Congress intended 
Section 4975(f)(3) to provide 
additional protection, not to limit 
the protection provided by 
Section 4975(c)(1)(A).211
We feel that by this language 
Congress intended § 4975(f)(3) to 
expand, not limit, the scope of the 
prohibited-transaction provision. 
It extends the reach of “sale or 
exchange” in § 4975(c)(1)(A) to 
include contributions of 
encumbered property that do not 
satisfy funding obligations. See 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 
307 (1974). Congress intended by 
§ 4975(f)(3) to provide additional 
protection, not to limit the 
protection already provided by § 
4975(c)(1)(A).212
Also as in Doe Agency, the Keystone Court adopts the SG’s 
language to reject the rationale for the lower court’s decision: 
The court of appeals interpreted 
“sale or exchange” in Section 
4975(c)(1)(A) contrary to its 
ordinary, settled meaning . . . as a 
result of its erroneous 
construction of Section 4975(f)(3).
That provision states . . . that “[a] 
transfer [of] real or personal 
property by a disqualified person 
We do not agree with the Court 
of Appeals’ conclusion that 
§4975(f)(3) limits the meaning of 
“sale or exchange,” as that phrase 
appears in §4975(c)(1)(A). 
Section 4975(f)(3) states that a 
transfer of property “by a 
disqualified person to a plan shall 
be treated as a sale or exchange if 
 211. Keystone Brief, supra note 207, at *23–*24.
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to a plan shall be treated as a sale 
or exchange if the property is 
subject to a mortgage or similar 
lien.” The court of appeals . . . 
read it as “implying that unless 
[property] is encumbered by a 
mortgage or lien, a transfer of 
property is not to be treated as if 
it were a sale or exchange.”213
the property is subject to a 
mortgage or similar lien.” The 
Court of Appeals read this 
language as implying that unless 
property “is encumbered by a 
mortgage or lien, a transfer of 
property is not to be treated as if 
it were a sale or exchange.” 951 
F.2d at 78.214
Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the Court in Posters N’ 
Things v. United States215 follows a similar form. The opinion 
adopts an abundance of language from the SG’s brief regarding 
Congressional intent, the Court’s precedent, and the opposing 
parties’ arguments. The SG’s brief and the Court’s opinion look 
at Congressional intent similarly: 
Congress omitted a factor that 
would have borne . . . directly on 
the question of subjective intent 
—the defendant’s own statements 
about his intent. That omission is 
particularly striking when Section 
857 is compared to the Model 
Drug Paraphernalia Act. The 
Model Act includes among the 
relevant factors “[s]tatements by 
an owner .  .  . concerning [the] 
use” of the object and “direct or 
circumstantial evidence of the 
intent of an owner .  .  . to deliver 
it to persons whom he knows, or 
should reasonably know, intend 
to use the object to facilitate a 
violation of this Act.” 8 App., 
infra, 6a-7a. Congress’s omission 
of both factors in Section 857 
Congress did not include among 
the listed factors a defendant’s 
statements about his intent or 
other factors directly establishing 
subjective intent. This omission is 
significant in light of the fact that 
the parallel list contained in the  . 
. . Model Drug Paraphernalia Act, 
on which §857 was based, 
includes among the relevant 
factors “statements by an owner 
 .  .  . concerning [the object’s] 
use” and “direct or circumstantial 
evidence of the intent of an 
owner . . . to deliver it to persons 
whom he knows, or should 
reasonably know, intend to use 
the object to facilitate a violation 
of this Act.” An objective 
construction of the definitional 
 213. Keystone Brief, supra note 207, at *21–*22 (brackets in original).
214. Keystone, 508 U.S. at 161. 
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indicates that it did not intend to 
define drug paraphernalia in 
terms of the subjective intent of 
the defendant.216
provision also finds support in 
§857(f), which establishes an 
exemption for items “traditionally 
intended for use with tobacco 
products.” An item’s “traditional” 
use is not based on the subjective 
intent of a particular defendant.217
In 1988, Congress replaced 
“primarily” with “traditionally” 
in order to “clarif[y]” the 
meaning of the exemption. See 
Pub. L. No. 100-690, Tit. IV, § 
6485, 102 Stat. 4384. If Congress 
had meant to shift from a 
subjective to an objective concept 
of intent, it is unlikely that it 
would have characterized the 
amendment as merely “clarifying” 
the law.218
In 1988, Congress added the 
word “traditionally” in place of 
“primarily” . . . in order to 
“clarif[y]” the meaning of the 
exemption. Pub. L. 100-690, Tit. 
VI, § 6485, 102 Stat. 4384. 
Congress’ . . . merely “clarifying” 
the law suggests that the original 
phrase . . . was not a reference to 
the fundamentally different 
concept of a defendant’s 
subjective intent.219
“[T]he failure of Congress 
explicitly and unambiguously to 
indicate whether mens rea is 
required does not signal a 
departure from this background 
assumption of our criminal law.” 
Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426. 
Instead, “far more than the simple 
omission of the appropriate 
phrase from the statutory 
definition is necessary to justify 
dispensing with an intent 
requirement.” United States 
Neither our conclusion that 
Congress intended an objective 
construction of the “primarily 
intended” language in §857(d), 
nor the fact that Congress did not 
include the word “knowingly” in 
the text of §857, justifies the 
conclusion that Congress 
intended to dispense entirely with 
a scienter requirement. This 
Court stated in United States v. 
United States Gypsum Co., 438 
U.S. 422, 438 . . . (1978): 
 216. Brief for the United States at *17–*18, Posters N’ Things v. United States, 1993 
WL 358181 (U.S. June 7, 1993) (No. 92-903) (brackets in original) [hereinafter Posters
Brief].
217. Posters, 511 U.S. at 520–21 (footnotes omitted).  
 218. Posters Brief, supra note 216, at *18–*19 (brackets in original).
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Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 438. 
Despite this presumption, “courts 
obviously must follow Congress’ 
intent as to the required level of 
mental culpability for any 
particular offense.” United States 
v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 406 
(1980). In this instance, however, 
we do not believe that the 
language or legislative history of 
Section 857 demonstrates that 
Congress intended to dispense 
with a mens rea requirement.220
“Certainly far more than the 
simple omission of the 
appropriate phrase from the 
statutory definition is necessary 
to justify dispensing with an 
intent requirement.”221
The SG’s brief and the Posters opinion respond to the 
arguments raised by petitioner in this way: 
Petitioners contend . . . that 
Section 857 is unconstitutionally 
vague as applied in this case. . . . 
Whatever its standing in the 
abstract, Section 857 is not 
unconstitutionally vague as 
applied to petitioners. The void-
for-vagueness doctrine “requires 
that a penal statute define the 
criminal offense with sufficient 
definiteness that ordinary people 
can understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that 
does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.” 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461. . . . 
Many of the items at issue in this 
case—including bongs, roach 
clips, and pipes designed for use 
with illegal drugs—are listed in 
Petitioners argue that § 857 is 
unconstitutionally vague as 
applied to them in this case. . . . 
Whatever its status as a general 
matter, we cannot say that § 857 
is unconstitutionally vague as 
applied in this case. First, the list 
of items in §857(d) constituting 
per se drug paraphernalia 
provides individuals and law 
enforcement officers with 
relatively clear guidelines as to 
prohibited conduct. With respect 
to the listed items, there can be 
little doubt that the statute is 
sufficiently determinate to meet 
constitutional requirements. 
Many items involved in this 
case—including bongs, roach 
clips, and pipes designed for use 
 220.  Posters Brief, supra note 216, at *20–*21.
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Section 857(d). There is no 
plausible basis for arguing that 
the statute is unconstitutionally 
vague concerning those items.222
with illegal drugs—are among the 
items specifically listed in § 
857(d).223
Petitioner Acty contends . . . that 
she was improperly convicted of 
aiding and abetting the 
manufacture and distribution of 
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
841(a)(1). . . . She asserts . . . that 
. . . under the district court’s 
instructions the jury was 
“required . . . to find that the 
substances were intended for 
manufacturing with a controlled 
substance.” Petitioner argues that 
the district court’s instructions 
. . . “create[d] ‘a presumption that 
relieve[d] the [government] of its 
burden of persuasion on an 
element of the offense,’” in 
violation of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. . 
. . Petitioner did not raise that 
argument in the court of appeals, 
and that court did not address 
it.224
Petitioner Acty’s other 
contentions are not properly 
before the Court. First, she argues 
that she was improperly 
convicted of aiding and abetting 
the manufacture and distribution 
of cocaine because the jury 
instructions created a 
“presumption” that certain items 
of drug paraphernalia “were 
intended for manufacturing with a 
controlled substance.” . . . This 
argument was neither raised in 
nor addressed by the Court of 
Appeals.225
In another section of the Posters opinion, the Court 
establishes the SG’s interpretation of “primarily intended” as the 
governing definition of that statutory phrase: 
Finally, our objective 
construction of the “primarily 
intended for use” language avoids 
Finally, an objective construction 
of the phrase “primarily 
intended” is consistent with the 
 222. Posters Brief, supra note 216, at *30–*32. 
223. Posters, 511 U.S. at 525–26. 
 224. Posters Brief, supra note 216, at *34.
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the creation of an unusual mens 
rea standard and is consistent 
with the meaning of similar 
language in other federal criminal 
statutes. See 18 U.S.C. 
921(a)(17)(B) (“armor piercing 
ammunition” excludes any 
projectile that the Secretary of the 
Treasury finds is “primarily 
intended” to be used for sporting 
purposes); 21 U.S.C. 860(d)(2) 
(“youth center” means a 
recreational facility “intended
primarily for use by persons 
under 18 years of age”).226
natural reading of similar 
language in definitional 
provisions of other federal 
criminal statutes. See 18 U.S.C. § 
921(a)(17)(B) (“armor piercing 
ammunition” excludes any 
projectile that is “primarily 
intended” to be used for sporting 
purposes, as found by the 
Secretary of the Treasury); 21 
U.S.C. §860(d)(2) (1988 ed., 
Supp. V) (“youth center” means a 
recreational facility “intended 
primarily for use by persons 
under 18 years of age”).227
2. Non-Blackmun Cases 
Justice Blackmun’s Lifted opinions for the Court present 
some of the most elaborate examples of opinions that adopt 
language from the briefs in all their facets, including legal 
reasoning. They also represent the majority of Lifted opinions. 
Other Lifted opinions show greater variation in the material they 
include from the briefs, but they all tend to take the focal brief as 
the template for the language in the opinion. Many of these, like 
the Blackmun opinions, rely on the SG’s briefs from beginning 
to end. 
The earliest Lifted relationship in the dataset comes from 
the 1955 opinion in Steiner v. Mitchell,228 authored by Chief 
Justice Warren. This case is atypical both because the legal-
reasoning section of the opinion is quite small compared to the 
discussion of facts and because the amount of overlapping 
language in the facts section is higher than in any other Lifted 
opinion and source brief at seventy-one percent. The Court’s 
reliance on the SG’s brief is apparent at the outset when the 
 226. Posters Brief, supra note 216, at *19.
227. Posters, 511 U.S. at 521. 
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question posed in the opinion is compared to the question in 
each brief:229
Under the provisions of 
the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, as amended by the 
Portal-to-Portal Act, does 
time spent by petitioner’s 
employees at its battery 
manufacturing plant in 
changing from street 
clothes into work clothes 
prior to punching the time 
clock at the beginning of 
the work day, and in 
taking shower baths and 
changing from work 
clothes to street clothes 
after punching out the 
time clock at the end of 
the work day, constitute 
compensable “time 
worked” under the 
amended Act?
230
Where workers in a 
battery plant must make 
extensive use of 
dangerously caustic and 
toxic materials and are 
compelled by 
circumstances, including 
vital considerations of 
health and hygiene, to 
change clothes and . . . to 
shower in facilities 
which State law requires 
their employer to 
provide, are these 
“principal,” rather than 
“preliminary” or 
“postliminary,” activities 




The precise question is 
whether workers in a 
battery plant must be paid 
as a part of their “principal” 
activities for the time 
incident to changing 
clothes at the beginning of 
the shift and showering at 
the end, where they must 
make extensive use of 
dangerously caustic and 
toxic materials, and are 
compelled by 
circumstances, including 
vital considerations of 
health and hygiene, to 
change clothes and to 
shower in facilities which 
state law requires their 
employer to provide, or 
whether these activities 
are “preliminary” or 
“postliminary” within the 
meaning of the Portal-to-
Portal Act.
232
The opinion in Steiner follows the facts as described in the 
SG’s brief and deviates considerably from the facts as conveyed 
 229. In all three-column Steiner quotations, the petitioner’s brief, which is not highly 
similar to the opinion, is in the left column. The highly similar SG’s brief is in the center 
column, and the opinion is in the right column. 
 230. Brief for Petitioners at *2–*3 Steiner v. Mitchell, 1955 WL 72535 (U.S. Aug. 12, 
1955) (No. 22) [hereinafter Steiner Petitioners’ Brief].
 231. Brief for Respondent at *2 Steiner v. Mitchell, 1955 WL 72536 (U.S. Sept. 26, 
1955) (No. 22) [hereinafter Steiner Respondent’s Brief.].
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by the petitioner.233 The facts are often also drawn from the 
record, but as part of the opinion, they are damaging to the 
petitioner’s contention that the working conditions in the battery 
plant are not hazardous and do not require the workers to take 
additional precautions to maintain their safety. The following 
examples exemplify how the pictures painted by the SG and the 
Court are quite different from that drawn by the petitioner. 
The manufacturing 
process for storage 
batteries involves the 
handling of toxic matter, 
such as sulphuric acid 
and lead oxide. This 
matter damages clothes 
if it is spilled on 
them.
234
All of the . . . production 
employees customarily 
work with or near the 
various chemicals used 
in the plant . . . . These 
include lead metal, lead 
oxide, lead sulphate, lead 
peroxide, and sulphuric 
acid . . . . Some of these 
are in liquid form, some 
are in powder form, and 
some are solid . . . . In 
the manufacturing 
process some of the 
materials go through 
various changes . . . . and 
give off dangerous 
fumes . . . . Some are 
spilled or dropped and 
thus become a part of the 
dust in the air . . . . In 
general, the chemicals 
permeate the entire plant 
and everything and 
everyone in it. .  .  . 
Moreover, “abnormal 
concentrations of lead 
have been discovered in 
All of the production 
employees, such as those 
with whom we are here 
concerned, customarily 
work with or near the 
various chemicals used 
in the plant. These 
include lead metal, lead 
oxide, lead sulphate, lead 
peroxide, and sulphuric 
acid. Some of these are 
in liquid form; some are 
in powder form, and 
some are solid. In the 
manufacturing process, 
some of the materials go 
through various changes 
and give off dangerous 
fumes. Some are spilled 
or dropped, and thus 
become a part of the dust 
in the air. In general, the 
chemicals permeate the 
entire plant and 
everything and everyone 
in it. . . . Abnormal 
concentrations of lead 
were discovered in the 
 233. It is worth noting that the opinion also derives from the lower court opinion, but the 
shared language is mainly between the opinion and the SG’s brief, and not between the 
lower court’s opinion and the Supreme Court’s opinion. 
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the bodies of some of 
[petitioners’] employees 
and [petitioners’] 
insurance doctor has 
recommended that such 
employees be segregated 
from their customary 
duties”. . . .
235




recommended that such 
employees be segregated 
from their customary 
duties.
236
In another instance the Steiner opinion directly adopts the 
SG’s reasoning concerning the petitioner’s treatment of its 
workers:
Petitioners concededly do not 
record or pay for the time which 
their employees spend in clothes 
changing and showering, which 
was found to amount to thirty 
minutes a day (ten minutes in the 
morning and twenty minutes in 
the afternoon) for each employee 
(R. 221). . . . Petitioners do not 
challenge the concurrent finding 
of the courts below that the 
clothes-changing and showering 
activities of the battery plant 
employees (men who work with 
or near dangerously toxic 
materials) are indispensable to 
the performance of productive 
work and integrally related 
thereto. See Pet. Br., p. 33.237
Petitioners do not record or pay 
for the time which their 
employees spend in these 
activities, which was found to 
amount to thirty minutes a day, 
ten minutes in the morning and 
twenty minutes in the 
afternoon, for each employee. 
They do not challenge the 
concurrent findings of the 
courts below that the clothes-
changing and showering 
activities of the employees are 
indispensable to the 
performance of their productive 
work and integrally related 
thereto.238
While the opinion in Steiner is unusually fact-intensive, 
most Lifted opinions, as is suggested by the Blackmun 
 235. Steiner Respondent’s Brief, supra note 231, at *3, *4 (citations omitted).
236. Steiner, 350 U.S. at 249–50. 
 237. Steiner Respondent’s Brief, supra note 231, at *7, *8.
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examples,239 include an even mix of lifted facts and lifted 
reasoning. Justice Goldberg’s opinion for the Court in Tilton v. 
Missouri Pacific Railroad240 is more typical of the Lifted type. 
Its language parallels the reasoning found in the SG’s brief as 
well as the SG’s construction of the facts. The certainty present 
in the petitioner’s argument makes its way into the Court’s 
opinion, as is apparent in the following: 
There is no room for doubt then, 
that, had Tilton, Beck and 
McClearn remained continuously 
on the job, they would have been 
able to complete the work period 
and qualify as journeymen in 
advance of those who “jumped” 
them in seniority during their 
absence. Each was entitled, under 
the agreement, to do carman’s 
work ahead of any man upgraded 
after him. It was only because of 
petitioners’ military service that 
men upgraded after them were 
able to work more days as carmen 
and to qualify as journeymen 
before them (Tilt. R. Stip. 29). 
But for their absence, petitioners 
would have qualified as 
journeymen carmen and achieved 
the seniority dates they now 
claim.241
There is no room for doubt in this 
case that . . . had petitioners 
remained continuously on the job 
during the period of their military 
service, they would have 
completed the work period and 
qualified as journeymen in 
advance of those who passed 
them in seniority during their 
absence. Each petitioner was 
entitled, under the labor 
agreement, to do carman’s work 
ahead of any upgraded after him. 
It was only because of 
petitioners’ military service that 
men upgraded after them were 
able to work more days as 
provisional carmen and to qualify 
as journeymen before them. But 
for their absence, petitioners 
would have qualified as 
journeymen carmen and achieved 
the seniority dates they now 
claim.242
Shared phrases such as “there is no room for doubt” 
indicate the parallel strength and confidence of the arguments in 
 239. See Section III(F)(1), supra.
 240. 376 U.S. 169 (1964). 
 241. Brief for Petitioners at *25–*26 Tilton v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 1963 WL 
105912 (U.S. Aug. 21, 1963) (No. 49) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Tilton Brief].
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the SG’s brief and the statements in the Court’s opinion. In other 
examples, the opinion continues to validate the SG’s reasoning 
as it takes contentions made in the brief as its own wording. As 
in Steiner, these statements in the opinion make the Tilton
Court’s position on the issues, and in particular its agreement 
with the SG’s logic, abundantly clear: 
For it was apparent that 
McKinney could never have 
predicted “with any degree of 
certainty,” when he left for 
service, that (1) a group 1 
position would fall vacant in his 
absence; (2) that he would elect 
to bid for it; (3) that he would be 
in adequate health to bid for it; 
and (4) that he would not have 
already lost his lower position 
because of unsatisfactory 
performance. . . . A returning 
veteran cannot claim a promotion 
that depends solely upon 
completing a prerequisite period 
of employment training unless he 
first works that period but, upon 
completion of that period of 
training, he can insist upon a 
seniority date in the higher 
position which reflects the delay 
in completing the requisite period 
of training caused by military 
service.243
It was apparent that McKinney, 
when he left for service, could not 
have predicted with absolute 
certainty that a group position 
would fall vacant in his absence; 
that he would be in adequate 
health to bid for it; that he would 
elect to bid for it; and that he 
would not have lost his lower 
position because of unsatisfactory 
performance. . . . [A] returning 
veteran cannot claim a promotion 
that depends solely upon 
satisfactory completion of a 
prerequisite period of 
employment training unless he 
first works that period. But upon 
satisfactorily completing that 
period, as petitioners did here, he 
can insist upon a seniority date 
reflecting the delay caused by 
military service.244
These samples of parallel construction in the SG’s brief and 
in the opinion in Tilton are similar to those in Steiner, depicting 
language that leaves little doubt regarding the position of the 
 243. Tilton Brief, supra note 241, at *22 (discussing McKinney v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R. 
Co., 357 U.S. 265 (1958)), *34.
244. Tilton, 376 U.S. at 177 (discussing McKinney v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R. Co., 357 U.S. 
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litigant or of the Court. They also show that the Tilton Court 
adopted the SG’s reasoning when ruling in the government’s 
favor.
Chief Justice Warren’s second Lifted opinion for the Court, 
Foti v. INS,245 adopts more reasoning similar to that in the SG’s 
brief even than appeared in Steiner. In particular, the Foti
Court’s reasoning is similar in construing the relevant legislative 
language and the practice of how to enforce it. 
From the beginning, by 
regulations having the force and 
effect of law, it has been 
exercised as an integral part of 
the administrative proceedings 
which have led to the issuance of 
a final deportation order.246
Thus, the administrative 
discretion to grant a suspension 
of deportation has historically 
been consistently exercised as an 
integral part of the proceedings 
which have led to the issuance of 
a final deportation order.247
The fundamental purpose of 
Section 106(a), its legislative 
history discloses, was to 
abbreviate the process of judicial 
review of deportation orders in 
order to frustrate certain 
practices, which had come to 
Congress’s attention, whereby 
persons subject to deportation 
were forestalling enforcement by 
dilatory tactics in the courts.248
The fundamental purpose behind 
§ 106(a) was to abbreviate the 
process of judicial review of 
deportation orders in order to 
frustrate certain practices which 
had come to the attention of 
Congress, whereby persons 
subject to deportation were 
forestalling departure by dilatory 
tactics in the courts.249
The last-mentioned consideration 
also refutes the majority’s 
suggestion that it is “incredible” 
that Congress meant to burden 
courts of appeals with review of 
And the suggestion of the court 
below that it is “incredible” that 
Congress meant to burden the 
Courts of Appeals with review of 
all orders denying discretionary 
 245. 375 U.S. 217 (1963). 
 246. Brief for Respondent at *19, Foti v. INS, 1963 WL 105680 (U.S. July 31, 1963) 
(No. 28) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Foti Brief].
247. Foti, 375 U.S. at 223.  
 248. Foti Brief, supra note 246, at *24.
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orders denying voluntary 
departure.250
relief in deportation cases is 
unconvincing.251
Like the Foti and Tilton opinions, Justice Marshall’s 
opinion for the Court in Hodel v. Indiana252 follows the 
language and reasoning of the SG’s brief. Significant to this case 
are the instances in which the opinion and the brief both discuss 
the importance of giving deference to Congressional choices: 
A court may not substitute its 
judgment for that of Congress 
merely because it believes that 
Congress was “unwise in not 
choosing a means more precisely 
related to its primary purpose.”253
“This court will certainly not 
substitute its judgment for that of 
Congress unless the relation of 
the subject to interstate commerce 
and its effect upon it are clearly 
non-existent.”254
All of the provisions invalidated 
by the district court are 
reasonably calculated to further 
the legitimate congressional goals 
of preserving the productive 
capacity of mined lands, 
minimizing the adverse 
environmental consequences that 
can result from surface mining or 
inadequate reclamation of mined 
lands, and protecting the public 
from health and safety hazards 
that may be created by surface 
mining.255
All the provisions invalidated by 
the court below are reasonably 
calculated to further these 
legitimate goals. For example, 
the approximate-original-contour 
requirement in §515(b)(5) is 
designed to avoid the 
environmental and other harm 
that may result from unreclaimed 
or improperly restored mining 
cuts.256
 250. Foti Brief, supra note 246, at *12.
 251. Foti, 375 U.S. at 230. 
 252. 452 U.S. 314 (1981). 
 253. Brief for Appellant at *26, Hodel v. Indiana, 1980 WL 339846 (U.S. Nov. 29, 
1980) (No. 80-231) [hereinafter Hodel Brief]. 
254. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 326 (quoting Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 521 (1922)). 
 255. Hodel Brief, supra note 253, at *17.
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That is surely a rational 
distinction for Congress to draw, 
and the fact that a particular state 
has more of one kind of mining 
operation than another does not 
establish discrimination in 
violation of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.257
Congress acted rationally in 
drawing these distinctions, and 
the fact that a particular State has 
more of one kind of mining oper-
ation than another does not estab-
lish impermissible discrimination 
under the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause.258
Moreover, Congress’ 
determination that federal 
intervention is necessary in this 
area was based in part on a desire 
to ensure that mine operators in 
states adhering to high 
performance and reclamation 
standards would not be 
disadvantaged in competition 
with their counterparts in states 
with less rigorous regulatory 
programs. See 30 U.S.C. (Supp. 
I) 1201(g). The statutory 
provisions overturned by the 
district court advance these 
legitimate goals of Congress and 
thus are rationally related to the 
protection of commerce from the 
adverse impact of surface mining 
operations.259
[T]he Act reflects the 
congressional goal of protecting 
mine operators in States adhering 
to high performance and 
reclamation standards from 
disadvantageous competition with 
operators in States with less 
rigorous regulatory programs. See 
30 U. S. C. §1201 (g) (1976 ed., 
Supp. III). The statutory 
provisions invalidated by the 
District Court advance these 
legitimate goals, and we conclude 
that Congress acted reasonably in 
adopting the regulatory scheme 
contained in the Act.260
As is the case with several other Lifted opinions, the 
opinion in Hodel uses the SG’s reasoning for rejecting the 
opposing parties’ arguments: 
 257. Hodel Brief, supra note 253, at *28 (footnote omitted).
258. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 333. 
 259. Hodel Brief, supra note 253, at *20.
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Moreover, even assuming 
arguendo that the provisions in 
question impose a greater burden 
on mine operators in midwestern 
states, that is no basis for striking 
them down as unconstitutional. A 
claim of arbitrariness or 
irrationality cannot be founded 
merely upon a statute’s lack of 
uniform geographic impact.261
More important, even were 
appellees correct that the 
challenged provisions impose a 
greater burden on mine operators 
in the Midwest, that is no basis 
for finding the provisions 
unconstitutional. A claim of 
arbitrariness cannot rest solely on 
a statute’s lack of uniform 
geographic impact. Secretary of 
Agriculture v. Central Roig 
Refining Co., 338 U.S. 604, 616-
619 . . . (1950).262
As in Virginia Surface Mining,
plaintiffs’ taking claims did not 
focus on any particular properties 
to which the challenged 
provisions have been applied, and 
the district court did not base its 
ruling on the denial of a surface 
mining permit for specific prime 
farmland operations proposed by 
plaintiffs.263
In this case as in Virginia Surface 
Mining, appellees’ takings claims 
do not focus on any particular 
properties to which the 
challenged provisions have been 
applied. Similarly, the District 
Court’s ruling did not pertain to 
the taking of a particular piece of 
property or the denial of a mining 
permit for specific prime 
farmland operations proposed by 
appellees.264
[P]laintiffs here, like their 
counterparts in Virginia Surface 
Mining, have made no showing 
that they were ever assessed civil 
penalties . . ., much less that the 
statutory prepayment requirement 
was ever applied to them or that it 
caused them injury.265
[L]ike their counterparts in 
Virginia Surface Mining,
appellees have made no showing 
that they were ever assessed civil 
penalties . . ., much less that the 
statutory prepayment requirement 
was ever applied to them or 
caused them any injury.266
 261. Hodel Brief, supra note 253, at *27.
262. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 332. 
 263. Hodel Brief, supra note 253, at *30.
264. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 334 (footnote omitted). 
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The links between the opinion and the SG’s brief in 
Hodel—from the interpretation of Congressional purpose in 
enacting a particular statute through the rejection of the 
opposing parties’ arguments—are also present in Justice 
Stewart’s opinion for the Court in Lehman v. Nakshian.267 In 
reviewing the purpose behind the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, the Lehman Court shares the SG’s views: 
The general experience has been 
that when Congress waives the 
sovereign immunity of the United 
States, it does not provide for trial 
by jury. . . . [J]ury trials 
historically have not been 
available in the Court of Claims 
in the broad range of cases within 
its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1491—i.e., all claims against 
the United States “founded either 
upon the Constitution, or any Act 
of Congress.”268
When Congress has waived the 
sovereign immunity of the United 
States, it has almost always 
conditioned that waiver upon a 
plaintiff’s relinquishing any claim 
to a jury trial.269
In any event, Rule 38(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that the right to trial by 
jury “as declared by the Seventh 
Amendment to the Constitution 
or as given by a statute of the 
United States shall be preserved 
to the parties inviolate” (emphasis 
added). This language certainly 
does not state a general rule that 
jury trials are to be presumed 
whenever Congress provides for 
cases to be brought in the district 
Moreover, Rule 38(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that the right to a jury 
trial “as declared by the Seventh 
Amendment to the Constitution 
or as given by a statute of the 
United States shall be preserved 
to the parties inviolate” (emphasis 
added). This language hardly 
states a general rule that jury 
trials are to be presumed 
whenever Congress provides for 
cases to be brought in federal 
266. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 335–36. 
 267. 453 U.S. 156 (1981). 
 268. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156 (Jan. 1981) (No. 80-
242) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter Lehman Brief]. 
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court. To the contrary, Rule 38(a) 
renders it necessary to look 
elsewhere for a specific, 
affirmative grant of the right 
where, as here, the Seventh 
Amendment does not apply.270
district courts. Indeed, Rule 38(a) 
requires an affirmative statutory 
grant of the right where, as in this 
case, the Seventh Amendment 
does not apply.271
As is evident, neither the 
provision for cases under Section 
15(c) to be brought in district 
court nor the use of the word 
“legal” in that section can be 
thought to manifest a 
congressional intent that the 
plaintiff in an ADEA action 
against the federal government 
have a right to trial by jury.272
Neither the provision for federal 
employer cases to be brought in 
district courts rather than the 
Court of Claims, nor the use of 
the word “legal” in that section, 
evinces a congressional intent 
that ADEA plaintiffs who 
proceed to trial against the 
Federal Government may do so 
before a jury.273
In its analysis of whether jury trials should be allowed in 
cases like Lehman, the Court follows the SG’s reasoning 
regarding the dearth of evidence presented by the respondent: 
There is nothing in the legislative 
history to indicate that Congress 
did not mean what it said in 
providing for jury trials in cases 
under Section 7(c) but not in 
cases against the federal 
government under Section 15(c). 
Indeed, the legislative history 
contains not a single reference to 
the issue of jury trials in federal 
sector cases, and any inferences 
that may be drawn from the 
legislative history on this 
question cut against the 
The respondent cannot point to a 
single reference in the legislative 
history to the subject of jury trials 
in cases brought against the 
Federal Government. There is 
none. And there is nothing to 
indicate that Congress did not 
mean what it plainly indicated 
when it expressly provided for 
jury trials in § 7(c) cases but not 
in § 15(c) cases. In fact, the few 
inferences that may be drawn 
from the legislative history are 
inconsistent with the respondent’s 
 270. Lehman Brief, supra note 268, at 31. 
271. Lehman, 453 U.S. at 164–65 (footnote omitted).
 272. Lehman Brief, supra note 268, at 40–41. 





      11/10/2016   09:41:10
38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 55 Side B      11/10/2016   09:41:10
FELDMANRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2016 12:38 PM
102 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
availability of jury trials. . . . 
[A]ny inferences that may be 
drawn from the legislative history 
cut strongly against respondent’s 
position.274
position.275
Writing for the Court in Carter v. Kentucky,276 another case 
dealing with defendants’ rights, Justice Stewart utilized the 
petitioner’s constitutional analysis—advanced by a team of 
public advocates employed by the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky—for requiring specific jury instructions under the 
Fifth Amendment: 
There is no doubt that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege, the 
presumption of innocence, and 
the burden of proof are closely 
aligned. . . . However, to say that 
these principles are closely 
aligned is not to say that they do 
not serve distinctive functions. 
Petitioner’s jury would have 
certainly derived “significant 
additional guidance” from an 
instruction that “no inference” 
should be drawn from his failure 
to testify. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 
U.S. at 484.277
Without question, the Fifth 
Amendment privilege and the 
presumption of innocence are 
closely aligned. But these 
principles serve different 
functions, and we cannot say that 
the jury would not have derived 
“significant additional guidance,” 
Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 
484 . . . , from the instruction 
requested.278
This passage demonstrates that the Carter opinion shares the 
strength of the argument made by petitioner’s counsel with 
phrases like “no doubt” in the petitioner’s brief and “[w]ithout 
question” in the opinion that leave little room for alternative 
interpretations of the Constitution’s language. 
 274. Lehman Brief, supra note 268, at 5–6, 17. 
275. Lehman, 453 U.S. at 166.
 276. 450 U.S. 288 (1981). 
 277. Brief for Petitioner at *39–*40, Carter v. Kentucky, 1980 WL 339742 (1981) (No. 
80-5060).
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Chief Justice Burger’s opinion for the Court in United
States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms 279 has a similar tone of 
certainty in its adoption of language from the SG’s brief, 
especially in the Court’s statutory analysis regarding whether 
Congress intended for the possibility of forfeiture proceedings 
after a gun owner is acquitted of criminal charges: 
Congress’ intent that Section 
924(d) be regarded as a civil 
rather than a criminal penalty is 
most clearly evidenced, however, 
by the procedural mechanisms it 
established for enforcing 
forfeitures under the statute. 
Section 924(d) does not prescribe 
the steps to be followed in 
effectuating a forfeiture, but 
rather incorporates by reference 
the procedures of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954. The 
Internal Revenue Code provides 
that proceedings to enforce 
forfeitures “shall be in the nature 
of a proceeding in rem in the 
United States District Court for 
the district where such seizure is 
made” (26 U.S.C. 7323). As 
outlined above, in rem actions 
are, by their very nature, civil 
proceedings, with jurisdiction 
dependent upon seizure of a 
physical object, in contrast with 
the in personam nature of 
criminal actions. See Calero-
Toledo, 416 U.S. at 684.280
Applying the first prong of the 
Ward test to the facts of the 
instant case, we conclude that 
Congress designed forfeiture 
under § 924(d) as a remedial civil 
sanction. Congress’ intent in this 
regard is most clearly 
demonstrated by the procedural 
mechanisms it established for 
enforcing forfeitures under the 
statute. Section 924(d) does not 
prescribe the steps to be followed 
in effectuating a forfeiture, but 
rather incorporates by reference 
the procedures of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954 (Code), 
26 U. S. C. § 7321–7328. The 
Code in turn provides that an 
action to enforce a forfeiture 
“shall be in the nature of a 
proceeding in rem in the United 
States District Court for the 
district where such seizure is 
made.” 26 U. S. C. §7323. In 
contrast to the in personam nature 
of criminal actions, actions in rem
have traditionally been viewed as 
civil proceedings, with 
jurisdiction dependent upon 
seizure of a physical object. See 
 279. 465 U.S. 354 (1984). 
 280. Brief for Petitioner at 21, United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 
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Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht 
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 684 
. . . (1974).281
In addition to the in rem nature of 
the action, the Internal Revenue 
Code provides a summary, 
administrative proceeding for 
forfeiture of seized goods valued 
at $2,500 or less. See 26 U.S.C. 
7325. . . That Congress provided 
a distinctly civil procedure for 
[forfeitures under 18 U.S.C. 924 
[36] (d)] indicates clearly that it 
intended a civil, not a criminal, 
sanction.” Helvering, 303 U.S. at 
402.282
In addition to establishing the in
rem nature of the action, the Code 
authorizes a summary 
administrative proceeding for 
forfeiture of items valued at 
$2,500 or less. . . . See 26 U.S.C. 
§7325. By creating such 
distinctly civil procedures for 
forfeitures under §924(d), 
Congress has “indicate[d] clearly 
that it intended a civil, not a 
criminal, sanction.” Helvering v. 
Mitchell, supra, 303 U.S., at 
402.283
When Congress enacted the 1968 
gun control legislation, “it was 
concerned with the widespread 
traffic in firearms and with their 
general availability to those 
whose possession thereof was 
contrary to the public interest.” 
Huddleston v. United States, 415 
U.S. 814, 824 (1974). . . .  The 
Gun Control Act of 1968, in 
particular, was designed to 
“control the indiscriminate flow” 
of firearms across state borders 
and to “assist and encourage 
States and local communities to 
adopt and enforce stricter gun 
control laws.” H.R. Rep. No. 
1577, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 
In enacting the 1968 gun control 
legislation, Congress “was 
concerned with the widespread 
traffic in firearms and with their 
general availability to those 
whose possession thereof was 
contrary to the public interest.” 
Huddleston v. United States, 415 
U.S. 814, 824 . . . (1974). 
Accordingly, Congress sought to 
“control the indiscriminate flow” 
of firearms and to “assist and 
encourage States and local 
communities to adopt and enforce 
stricter gun control laws.” H. R. 
Rep. No. 1577, 90th Cong., 2d 
Sess., 8 (1968). Section 924(d) 
plays an important role in 
281. 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 363. 
 282. 89 Firearms Brief, supra note 280, at 21–22. 
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(1968). . . . Section 924(d) plays 
an important role in furthering the 
“broad prophylactic purpose” of 
the 1968 gun control legislation 
(Dickerson v. New Banner 
Institute, supra, slip op. 15) by 
eliminating stocks of firearms 
that have been used or intended 
for use outside regulated channels 
of commerce.284
furthering the prophylactic 
purposes of the 1968 gun control 
legislation by discouraging 
unregulated commerce in 
firearms and by removing from 
circulation firearms that have 
been used or intended for use 
outside regulated channels of 
commerce.285
By sharing the SG’s reasoning in 89 Firearms, the Court 
shows its regard for the SG’s interpretation of Congressional 
intent and purpose to such a degree that it is willing to 
incorporate many aspects of the SG’s argument wholesale into 
the opinion. This, however, is not an anomaly in this sort of 
case. Lifted opinions, almost without exception, convey the 
strength of the Court’s faith in the SG’s approach.286 On a 
separate level, though, it also shows great deference on the part 
of the Court to the SG’s contentions. The SG has insight into the 
inner workings of the government not available to other parties, 
but even an insider with special knowledge can be fallible. 
Unfortunately, comparisons of briefs and opinions cannot 
provide evidence of the Court’s level of scrutiny into the SG’s 
contentions.
IV. CONCLUSION: MAKING SENSE OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN MERITS BRIEFS AND SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
These examples present a slice of the relationship between 
Supreme Court briefs and opinions. They highlight cases in 
which the Court has borrowed a large amount of substantive 
language from merits briefs. While there has been prior 
scholarship demonstrating that Supreme Court opinions borrow 
 284. 89 Firearms Brief, supra note 280, at 24–25. 
285. 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 364.
 286. One exception would be Carter. See text accompanying note 276, supra (noting 
that lifted language in Carter came from a brief filed by a team of lawyers working for 





      11/10/2016   09:41:10
38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 57 Side B      11/10/2016   09:41:10
FELDMANRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2016 12:38 PM
106 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
language from briefs,287 the extent of this borrowing at the 
individual-case level is uncharted territory. The cases discussed 
here illuminate important factors regarding the relationship 
between briefs and opinions in cases that include high levels of 
overlapping language. Yet these comparisons between briefs and 
opinions leave us with unanswered questions. 
The comparisons drawn from these cases provide further 
confirmation that repeat players—the OSG in particular—have 
strong relationships with the Court that makes this extent of 
language sharing possible.288 They also help differentiate the 
types of impact a brief can have on an opinion. There are clear 
differences between cases in which the opinions share citations 
and quoted language with the briefs, and cases in which 
opinions share language that was original with the briefs. The 
former cases present examples of briefs that were likely 
influential to the extent that they focused the Court’s attention 
on particular precedent, on specific places in the record, and on 
relevant statutes, all intended to assist the Court in its decision 
making. But the latter—the Lifted relationships that are the 
focus of this article—present puzzles due not only to the extent 
of the language shared, but also due to the content of the shared 
language.
How deeply should we read into the borrowed language in 
Lifted opinions?  If we dig into other cases and probe the 
relationships between briefs and opinions, there are almost 
assuredly more examples of this type of language sharing, 
potentially at levels that approximate those in the cases covered 
287. See, e.g., Corley, supra note 22 (discussing the influence of merits briefs on the 
language of Supreme Court opinions).
 288. For discussion of repeat players’ success in the Supreme Court see, for example, 
Joseph W. Swanson, Experience Matters: The Rise of a Supreme Court Bar and Its Effect 
on Certiorari, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 175 (2007); Kevin T. McGuire, Explaining 
Executive Success in the U. S. Supreme Court, 51 POLITICAL RESEARCH Q. 505 (1998), 
and Kevin T. McGuire, Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The Role of Experienced 
Lawyers in Litigation Success, 57 J. POLITICS 187 (1995). For a more detailed look at the 
Solicitor General’s unique impact on Supreme Court opinion language, see Black and 
Owens, supra note 22, and Patricia A. Millett, “We’re Your Government and We’re Here 
to Help”: Obtaining Amicus Support from the Federal Government in Supreme Court 
Cases, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 209 (2009), the latter noting that, “once requested by 
the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General’s analysis of the importance of a question 
presented and the necessity and appropriateness of certiorari review carry significant 
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in this article. There are likely even more cases in which minor 
editing changed the phrasing so that language does not align 
perfectly between brief and opinion, but in which high levels of 
shared language predominate. 
A few of the implications from relationships predicated on 
language lifting bear consideration. That Supreme Court 
opinions share language with briefs itself is not an original 
concept. There are also many sources that the Justices or their 
clerks would have located without the assistance of briefs, so in 
some cases it is mere happenstance that the language is shared. 
Judges also often want briefs to organize and synthesize the 
information in case records and information relevant to judicial 
decision of the issues raised in them,289 so they may actively 
seek specific language in the briefs before them. 
The unattributed shared language, however, is not so 
readily explained by well-organized and persuasive briefs. 
Opinions can and do cite to briefs, just as they cite other sources 
of law, analysis, and information. In Russello for instance, the 
opinion cites to the petitioner’s brief when it says that 
Petitioner himself has not attempted to define the term 
“interest” as used in § 1963(a)(1). He insists, however, that 
the term does not reach money or profits because, he says: 
‘Interest,’ by definition, includes of necessity an interest in 
something.’ Brief for Petitioner 9.”290
Similarly in National Bank of Commerce, the Court cites to the 
respondent’s brief, stating that 
[c]ommon sense dictates that a right to withdraw qualifies 
as a right to property for purposes of §§ 6331 and 6332. In 
a levy proceeding, the IRS “‘steps into the taxpayer’s 
shoes,’” United States v. Rodgers, 461 U. S., at 691, n. 16, 
 . . .  quoting 4 Bittker, ¶ 111.5.4, at 111-102; M. Saltzman, 
IRS Practice and Procedure ¶ 14.08, p. 14-32 (1981); Brief 
for Respondent 8.291
These examples show that even in Lifted opinions, the Court is 
willing to cite to the briefs in circumstances in which the brief 
informs the opinion writer’s choice of language. 
 289. See Rehnquist, supra note 17; Tate, supra note 17.
 290. Russello, 464 U.S. at 22 (1983). 
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In the bulk of the Lifted relationships identified in this 
article, however, the Court does not cite sources for its choices 
of language. Yet the extent of shared language in these cases, 
and the Justices’ and clerks’ access to the briefs, make the likely 
source of the language clear.292  This lack of attribution raises 
two concerns. The first has to do with the trustworthiness or 
credibility of the source: How are we to know that the shared 
language in the opinion was lifted from a brief written by a 
reputable source? The second has to do with the normative value 
that we place on courts’ citing to the sources they use: When 
there is a clear indication that the language lifted into the 
opinion did not originate with either the Justice writing for the 
Court or an obvious third-party source (a constitutional 
provision, a statute, a regulation, or an official comment, for 
instance, or perhaps a law-review article known in the relevant 
field), shouldn’t we expect the Justice writing for the Court to 
make that clear? 
The trustworthiness quandary may be diminished because 
of the source of language in these cases. The relationship 
between the SG and the Court is predicated on trust.293 This is 
evident from the numerous times the Court has invited the SG to 
file amicus briefs in cases in which the government is not a 
party.294 This trust and the reasons behind it might allay 
 292. Since clerks are involved in the process of drafting opinions it is plausible that 
these choices of shared language stem from clerks’ decisions. To this point, in an interview 
Justice Ginsburg related the clerks’ role in opinion drafting when she said, “I would like to 
do all of my own work so I could write all my opinions myself, but there is just not enough 
time to do that.” Todd C. Peppers, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Her Law Clerks, in Peppers & 
Ward, supra note 2, at 397. It is also the case that even if the shared language in some of 
these instances stems from a source that both the brief and the opinion share, the lack of 
attribution does not change.
293. See, e.g., REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF 
LAW 161 (1992) (noting in discussion of a related topic that “solicitors general must 
consider the trust they enjoy with the Court”); cf. Michael A. Bailey, Brian Kamoie & 
Forrest Maltzman, Signals from the Tenth Justice: The Political Role of the Solicitor 
General in Supreme Court Decision Making, 49 AM. J. POLITICAL SCI. 72, 83 (2005) 
(noting, after examining relationship between SG and Court, SG’s “direct impact” on 
“decisions reached by the Court” and “influence” on “all justices,” and acknowledging 
SG’s “success rates”). 
 294. See, e.g., Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy,
72 YALE L.J. 694, 717 (1963) (describing the Court’s seeking the expertise of the SG and 
others by inviting them to file amicus briefs); see also Millett, supra note 288, at 225 
(noting that the SG filed more amicus briefs—thirty—than merits briefs—twenty-seven—
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concerns about the source of the shared language. If there is a 
repeat litigator in the Court who is expected to present accurate 
information and who is held to a lofty standard, that litigator is 
the government’s attorney—the SG. Nonetheless, the SG is also 
an advocate who makes arguments to win cases. Furthermore, 
the government may have an agenda in a case that does not 
coincide with the best interest of justice or of the rule of law. If 
the SG frames arguments to win cases, then the language used 
may be stronger or more argumentative than we would expect 
from an agnostic party or from the Court itself. 
Although the SG’s argument and statements of fact, or 
those of any other similarly situated litigator, may be accurate, 
the level of accuracy expected from these parties does not 
parallel that expected from the Court. Thus, there may be certain 
professional and societal expectations of due diligence in 
checking the law and the facts on the part of the Justices and the 
clerks that is not equally expected from others. This is not to say 
that such due diligence does not occur in circumstances with 
unattributed language sharing; it is only to say that the lack of 
attribution raises questions about the level of due diligence 
performed.295
The normative question of when a citation in a Supreme 
Court opinion is proper or expected is primarily untapped.296 Yet 
because it sits at the apex of the judicial hierarchy, the Supreme 
Court and its opinions are not reviewed by other judicial bodies 
that could fashion norms and expectations for this practice. We 
should in consequence examine the practice more closely. 
Further research might demonstrate that there are reasons why 
the Justices may want to provide citations when there are clear 
295. The question of the source of lifted language may be further complicated in 
situations in which briefs look to resources like the opinions below for their language, 
simply re-framing it in a most favorable light. See, e.g., Justin Wedeking, Supreme Court 
Litigants and Strategic Framing, 54 AM. J. POLITICAL SCI. 617 (2010). 
 296. There is a small body of scholarship looking specifically at judicial plagiarism, but 
it is primarily focused on the copyright implications of the practice and its use by the lower 
courts. See, e.g., Douglas R. Richmond, Unoriginal Sin: The Problem of Judicial 
Plagiarism, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1077 (2013); Carol M. Bast & Linda B. Samuels, Plagiarism 
and Legal Scholarship in the Age of Information Sharing: The Need for Intellectual 
Honesty, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 777 (2008); Gerald Lebovits, Alifya V. Curtin & Lisa 
Solomon, Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 237 (2008); Jaime 
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sources—reasons including the potential positive effect that 
those citations could have on perceptions of the Court’s 
institutional legitimacy.297
Further research into the possibility that large-scale 
language borrowing is idiosyncratic to particular Justices might 
also be productive. Justice Blackmun authored more than half of 
the Lifted opinions revealed by my research.298 This may 
indicate that he, more than other Justices, was willing to directly 
adopt the language of the briefs.299 Still, many other Justices in 
the time period of the study authored Lifted opinions, and if the 
word-number threshold for Lifted opinions was loosened, this 
number would grow considerably. 
As one team of commentators aptly wrote, “There is much 
to be learned from studies that compare a judicial opinion with 
the briefs and trial transcripts and other materials on which the 
judge based—or purported or was expected to base—his 
opinion.”300 Awareness of the practice of large-scale language 
borrowing may help bring clarity to this part of the process of 
opinion construction. Still, the rules for drafting opinions when 
they are primarily based on contentions made in merits briefs are 
unscripted. Supreme Court opinion writing is a unique enterprise 
that may deserve deference not afforded to other types of 
writing. By removing the mystery that obscures this part of the 
opinion-construction process, however, we may begin to 
develop expectations for the role that briefs should play in it. 
And we may also begin to assess the significance, if any, that we 
297. See generally, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A
PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006) (describing the many audiences that may 
affect Supreme Court Justices’ behavior and why the Justices likely care about the opinions 
of these audiences).
298. Cf. Tony Mauro, Lifting the Veil: Justice Blackmun’s Papers and the Public 
Perception of the Supreme Court, 70 MO. L. REV. 1037 (2005) (describing Justice 
Blackmun’s other uncommon behaviors as a Justice). 
 299. Although this might be accurate at the level of particular cases, the average 
percentage of overlapping language between briefs and Justice Blackmun’s opinions is not 
high compared to the other Justices. See Feldman, supra note 5 (showing that the mean 
overlap value across the 1946 through 2013 terms is 9.54 percent, and that Justice 
Blackmun’s mean overlap value is just above average at 9.90 percent). 
 300. LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM W. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF 
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place on attribution to briefs when opinions adopt their 
substantive language. 
